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Summary
This comparative analysis of the relationships between religion, politics and governance in India,
Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania draws on research undertaken as part of a wider research programme
on religions and development. The starting point for these studies was the need to examine the
implication of the ‘return of religion’ for ‘good governance’,  in particular the extent to which religious
actors (religious communities, faith based organizations and religious political parties) help or hinder
development, especially with respect to pro-poor policy and practice.  Each country study provided a
historical evaluation of state-religion relationships since independence and detailed case studies of
religious actors that assess contemporary patterns of governance and engagement with politics.
The analysis draws on the sociological principle of differentiation between politics and religion, set
within the comparative historical context of the post-colonial state. What emerges is the gradual
demise of the secular state to a condition today in which there are strong pressures towards
conflictual relationships between politics and religion in  highly differentiated polities and consensual
relationships in integrationist (low differentiated) polities. These pressures, moreover, are reflected in
the electoral mobilization of religious identities; state co-option of religious demands; modes of
resistance by marginalized groups through ‘religions of revolution’; and, post-9/11, new discourses
and policy innovations centred on religious identities. Historically, the ‘crisis of governance’ in these
states from the late 1970s onwards played a critical role in undermining the coalition of social and
political forces that had underpinned the post-colonial secular state, in the process creating new public
spaces for religious actors to occupy.
Case studies of religious actors engaged in contemporary politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania provide some fascinating insights into the changing nature of governance in these states and
also the transformations which are occurring within the religious traditions.
 First, democracy, even in religiously homogenous societies such as Pakistan, operates to undercut the
power of religion and religious actors, while conversely, lack of democracy (e.g. under military regimes)
encourages the use of religion as a means of exercising power, pressures towards a greater integration
of religion and the state, and the use of religious actors by the state to increase its legitimacy. It also sets
up a vicious cycle of radicalization.
 Second, the interests of poor religious communities are more likely to be articulated if there are specific
incentives for political parties (such as increasing their size and electoral support base) and there are
programmes intended to benefit these groups (e.g. affirmative action). Engagement with the political
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process by such communities can lead to changes in their sense of identity, as it sets up internal
debates about the logic of political engagement.
 Third, religious actors sometimes have an ambiguous record on good governance and development.
While most criticize underdevelopment, their ideas about the meaning and purpose of development
diverge widely. Some are enthusiastic about the normative ‘good governance’ agenda, while others put
forward alternative conceptions of development that foreground religious ideals and practices. However,
the latter may not see gender discrimination, religious discrimination or exclusion of the poor or marginal
religious communities, either by public policy or within the theologies of their own traditions, as a
problem.
 Fourth, encounters between state and religion in these countries are dynamic, fluid and changeable. The
‘good governance’ agenda in Africa and Asia has impelled states to be more accommodating of cultural
and religious diversity and gender equality, sometimes at the behest of external donors and multilateral
development agencies. In the same way, in some cases, religious traditions and theologies have also
provided creative responses to traditional dilemmas in the form of inter-faith dialogues that extend
beyond mere tolerance and accommodation.
Overall, however, these departures and innovations remain marginal to the main debates about the
state and religion in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania. Their limited impact demonstrates how
challenging it is for religious actors in Asia and Africa to be drivers of good governance and
developmental changes.
An appropriate role for religion in contemporary governance in the South is more likely to be developed
through understanding the nature and outcomes of general policies to improve governance and
development than an exclusive focus on the role and performance of religious actors themselves.
Recognizing this is the first crucial step towards a better understanding of the implications of the
‘return of religion’ in developing societies.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In developed and developing societies alike the last thirty years have witnessed the ‘return of religion’
to public life.  This process is normally dated from the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and has been
distinguished by the mobilization of religiously-based political identities, virulent anti-secularism and
vocal claims for a more generous role for religions in the public sphere where, for the most part, the
operative norm since 1945 has been the secular state (Casanova, 1994; Habermas, 2006; Haynes,
2007).  Radical political movements in the name of militant Islam have created a global security threat:
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, militant Islam threatens to capture the state for a global jihad against the
West; in Europe the call by some Muslim groups for shari’a law has led to an anti-Islamic backlash;
and in large parts of the Middle East and South East Asia, religious terrorism in the name of Islam has
mobilised new political formations (Klausen, 2005; Roy, 2004).  Fundamentalist Christianity has also
been mobilized as never before. The presidency of George W. Bush was notable for its overt efforts to
promote Christian values in public and international affairs, as the Christian Right was elevated to
prominence that far exceeded its political constituency.  In the United Kingdom, too, the leadership of
Tony Blair was marked by a public profession of the Prime Minister’s Christian values which, his
critics alleged, underpinned his support for the second Gulf War and the ‘war on terror’. Political
Hinduism has also been resurgent in trying to restructure the secular foundations of the Indian state.
From a marginal force in the 1980s, it stormed the citadels of political power in the late 1990s and
prosecuted its sectarian creed by unleashing state power against religious minorities. The Gujarat
pogrom of 2002, which saw the murder of 5,000 Muslims and the further displacement of 100,000 into
relief camps, was the most notorious example (Singh, 2004).  In short, since the late 1970s,
religiously-based political movements have emerged in most world religions (Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism) and, in encountering or rejecting the predominantly
secular public sphere, have created new dilemmas for public policy.
Nowhere is this confrontation more apparent than in the contestation between religion and the state in
the South.1 Here the period since 1979 has witnessed the rise of religious nationalism that aims to
‘reinvent’ the nation in a new language of belonging saturated in religion, ethno-religious conflicts for
self-determination, and radical religious movements that reject the raison d’ etre  of the ‘ secular state’
(Jurgensmeyer, 2000).  This crisis of legitimacy, which pervades most states in the developing world
today has roots in, among other things, what Appleby (2000) calls the ‘ambivalence of religion’:  its
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dual potential as a democratizing as well as a revolutionary force for those disenchanted with
modernity and the collapse of governance. For this reason, understanding the role of religion in politics
in the South today is central both to recognizing the dilemmas of governance and unlocking the
potential for effecting ‘good governance’.
To be sure, there is a significant body of literature on religion and politics in the South, on such themes
as democratization, religious nationalism, ethno-religious conflicts and the role of faith based
organizations (FBOs) as members of civil society in the agenda for improving governance (Cf. Singh
et al, 2007).  This emerging output has been augmented by the recognition by leading development
organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that
religious and cultural liberty should be placed in the foreground of the development process because it
offers a new point of departure for rethinking relationships between religion and the state in developing
societies (UNDP, 2004).  However, despite this interest,  little systematic or comparative research has
been undertaken on  religious communities’ and organizations’ relationships with politics and
governance in the South. This neglect appears all the more surprising in light of the resources
commanded by FBOs in developing societies and their potential to contribute to the development
process (Marshall, 2005; WHO, 2007).
This oversight, as Deneulin and Rakodi (2011) suggest, may well be due in part to the positivist bias of
the social sciences, which has been strongly influenced by Western conceptions of modernity and
progress. It is thirty years since World Development published a special issue on religious values and
development, in which contributors argued that religion and the moral basis of societies should be
integrated into development studies and policy, but there has been precious little theoretical or
conceptual innovation since (Deneulin with Bano, 2009).  At one end of the spectrum there is still a
dominant positivist paradigm that pervades the social sciences, especially economics and political
science. At the other is the ‘constructivist turn’, in which meaning and language have become the main
foci for a critical appraisal of Western modernity, as well as ‘deconstructions’ of such concepts as
secularism, religion and development itself (Nandy, 1999). Although constructivist approaches have
been especially popular since 9/11, most notably in efforts to unveil the secular ‘theology’ of political
science (Cf. Philpott, 2002), their utility in combining a new critical understanding with an ability to
explain general change appears to still be relatively limited. Indeed, what is often absent in
constructivist analysis is a serious recognition of structural constraints that create the complex web of
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material, political and symbolic power which determines governance in developing societies. But if, as
constructivists insist, understanding of this is trapped in a ‘world of meanings and ‘meanings exhaust
the world’ then, as Gellner provocatively asks, “…where is the room for coercion through the whip, gun
or hunger?” (Gellner, 1992, p. 63).
It is these limitations of both positivism and constructivism that have led Deneulin and Rakodi to
suggest that a more appropriate approach to the study of religion and development is one that draws
on interpretivism, that is, an empathetic understanding of phenomena such as religion based on the
ideas and meanings attributed to it by its adherents. Interpretivism is distinct from the unbridled
subjectivism that is sometimes all too evident in some strands of constructivism; rather, it recognizes
that the nature of people’s participation in social and cultural life requires an appreciation of both the
structural context within which this participation takes place and the meanings and values that the
participants ascribe to it (Cf. Kohli, 1995).
1.2 Methodology and approach
Methodologically, this study begins from the premise that a comparative-historical approach,
combined with an interpretivist understanding, is needed to understand religion, politics and
governance in countries of the South. The former enables us to identify the broad parameters of the
relationship between religion and politics since independence. The latter, by incorporating detailed
case studies of religious actors2 – religious communities, FBOs, religious political parties and other
such organizations – gives us a more rounded appreciation of what engagement in politics in the
South  means for these actors. Together these two approaches are likely to provide us with a more
informed insight into the subject than hitherto.
The research for this paper was undertaken as part of a larger comparative research programme on
the relationships between religions and development. It focuses on India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania – countries which face similar challenges of governance and poverty reduction. In Nigeria
and Pakistan, for example, post-colonial democratization has been thwarted by periods of military rule.
Similarly, in India and, to a lesser extent in Tanzania, the secular heritage of independence has been
compromised by the rise of religiously-based political identities. In all four countries common
governance challenges offer invaluable lessons for understanding religious actors’ engagement with
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politics. In addition, understanding the nature of this engagement may also hold possible clues about
religious actors’ capacity to be either drivers or obstacles to developmental change.3
More specifically, the aims of this research component were to understand the relationships between
religion, politics and governance4. In particular, it sought to:
(i) examine the relationships between religious communities and religious actors (organized religious
groups and FBOs) and political processes and governance;
(ii) identify whether and how religious actors are obstacles to or levers of change for development;5
(iii) assess what engagement in the political process means for religious actors, especially their poor and
women members; and
(iv) identify, within religious actors’ relationship with the state and broader processes of governance,
potential entry points for achieving pro-poor change.
These aims were addressed in two ways. First, existing research in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania was synthesized, with a particular emphasis on how the state-religion relationship has
evolved and is changing. Second, detailed case studies were undertaken of selected religious actors,
to examine how they interface with politics, explore in some depth their engagement in politics and
assess how this is shaping contemporary governance in the four countries. These case studies
involved the use of secondary data and extensive interviews with key informants and leaders of
religious political parties, FBOs and faith communities (for a full list of the case studies, see Appendix
1).6
At the outset it needs to be emphasized that the four project countries were far from ideal
comparators, despite sharing some similar socio-economic conditions, as outlined above. While three
are formally secular states (India, Nigeria and Tanzania), Pakistan is an established Islamic republic;
the size of the countries and their governance arrangements differ; and while three (India, Nigeria,
Tanzania) are religiously and ethnically diverse, Pakistan is less so (see Appendix 2).  The difficulties
this diversity raises for comparability were compounded in the selection of appropriate and equivalent
religious actors because of the heavily contested meaning of ‘religion’, ‘religious communities’ and
‘FBOs’.7
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As a result, the case studies in the four countries were not identical.  In India, the research focused on
religiously marginal Dalit communities who were mobilized by religious and non-religious political
parties competing for office and seeking to extend their support base. In Pakistan, because of the
operational difficulties of studying some of the religious actors against a background of rising militancy
and army operations against militants, the focus was on religious political parties. In Nigeria and
Tanzania, on the other hand, because of the size, number and significance of religious organizations/
FBOs and some officially sponsored bodies representing religious communities (e.g. in Tanzania
BAKWATA and UAMSHO), it was deemed more appropriate to concentrate on these organizations
rather than religious communities or religious political parties, which are proscribed by law. Strictly
speaking, not all the bodies studied are FBOs, but nor are they exclusive representatives of organized
religious communities or have the potential characteristics of religious parties. Because the
organizations studied in Nigeria and Tanzania do not all fit into a single clearly definable category, we
shall use the term religious organizations (ROs).8
Limitations of space preclude a detailed discussion of relations between the national and sub-national
levels of government in the four countries or some of the mechanisms adopted to manage religious
and ethnic diversity, including affirmative action provisions, power sharing and informal convocational
practices.9 However, it is recognized that mobilizations around religious identities, for example before
and after colonialism, were important factors in the evolution of such mechanisms and that they have
been significantly influenced by the changing nature of federal-state (national-sub-national) relations in
these countries.
In order to reflect ethnic and religious diversity, where possible our case studies were regionally based
and representative of the major religious traditions within the four countries (except in Pakistan, which
is largely mono-religious). In India, the case studies included three marginal Dalit communities among
Muslims, Buddhist and Sikhs in Maharashtra and Punjab, where the dominant traditions are Hinduism
and Sikhism respectively.10 In Nigeria, the states of Kano, Oyo and Anambra were selected for their
different configuration of Muslim-Christian populations.11  In Tanzania, the Christian and Muslim ROs
selected included examples from both the religiously mixed mainland and Muslim Zanzibar. In
Pakistan, in contrast, because of the politically significant nature of the first government by a coalition
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of religious political parties, elected to power in the North Western Frontier Province between 2002
and 2007, the research concentrated on the Muttahida-Majlise-e-Amal (MMA).
The rest of this report is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the findings of the review of
literature from the four countries, identifying how the significance of religion in these four polities has
changed since independence, with a particular emphasis on changing state-religion relationships.
Section 3 draws on the case study material to highlight religious actors’ engagement with
contemporary issues of governance. Finally, Section 4 summarises the comparative lessons from the
case studies for a broader understanding of religions, politics and governance in the South and
beyond.
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2 Religion, politics and governance in India,
Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania since independence
2.1 Religion, politics and governance: an organizing framework
Most approaches to the subject of religion and politics tend to focus on the constitutional relationship
between the church (religion(s)) and the state (Singh et al, 2007).  While this, as we shall see below, is
an appropriate point of reference, it rarely provides a useful insight into what Philpott calls “how
religions meet the state” (2007, p. 506). A part of the reason is that, whereas the state is an easily
identifiable category, recognizing religions and religious organizations that articulate a collective voice
can be quite problematic, though at some level such religious actors do speak for a collectivity. These
underlying tensions between religion and the state, which according to Philpott are inherent in their
divergent claims, are balanced through the sociological principle of differentiation; that is, “the degree
of mutual autonomy between  religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal
authority…the extent of each entity’s authority over the other’s basic prerogative to hold office, choose
its officials , set its distinctive polices, carry out its activities, in short, govern itself” (ibid., p. 507).12
Differentiation ranges from high (completely separated and autonomous) to low (where religion and
state are integrated), and can be consensual or conflictual (both in conditions of high or low
differentiation).13 Table 1 below outlines some of the examples of such differentiation.
Table 1: Types of differentiation and exemplars
Source: Adapted from Philpott (2007, p. 508)





High-differentiated  United States   Communist Poland 
India*    Chile under Pinochet 
States with ‘engaged  Kemalist Turkey 
Buddhism’   Post-colonial Indonesia 
Tanzania*   Nigeria* 
 
Low-integrationist  Iran    Communist Bulgaria 
    Saudi Arabia   Romania, Soviet Union, 
  Colonial Latin America Czechoslovakia and  
      Postcolonial Sri Lanka 
      Arab nationalist regimes 
        Pakistan* 
 
* At independence 
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Differentiation and integration are, of course, not givens, but change over time.14 As will be seen from
the four case studies below, economics and social conditions can affect the state’s relationship with
religion. Conversely, changes in the ideas of religious actors can, over time, have a significant impact
on their orientation towards the state. The third (‘Catholic’) wave of democratization in Latin America,
for example, is normally associated with the teachings of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) on
human rights, which marked the ‘church’s withdrawal from temporal prerogatives – a definitive
doctrinal embrace of differentiation’ (ibid., p. 510). Similarly, Islamist ideas have incubated in statist
regimes in Muslim countries that have traditionally been characterized by authoritarian integration e.g.
Egypt. In these examples, political Islam has been neutered, while the state has co-opted moderate
religious leaders and provides legal support for Islam. It is in these cases of low and conflictual
integration, however, that there has been a dramatic transformation from ‘religions of resistance’ to
‘religions of revolution’, underpinned by radical theologies that aim to establish a new form of Islamic
integration.
Religious parties are often the main institutions that connect religion and the state.  But how this
relationship works in practice is heavily mediated by whether the polity is differentiated or integrated.
In a differentiated polity like India, for instance, the mobilization inspired by the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)15 poses a major challenge to India’s secular democracy, but the structures of differentiation
ensure that the challenge is undertaken in a competitive environment. For example, elections in 2004
marked a significant national reversal for the Hindutva wave led by the BJP.  In contrast, elections in an
integrated polity, for example Pakistan, often result in religious parties playing an illiberal role because,
although they accept the principle of competition in the electoral sphere, they resolutely support strong
constitutional integration, “promot[ing] Islam’s place in society and allow[ing] little religious freedom”
(Philpott, 2007, p. 518).  As we shall see, historically, radical religious parties in Pakistan have
maintained an incestuous relationship with the statist military regimes against popular democratic
forces (e.g. the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)) and have only begun to directly oppose the state since
the ‘war on terror’ and the army’s campaign against the Pakistan Taliban since 2009.
The distinction between differentiation and integration is also useful for understanding how states
address issues of public policy in the fields of religious freedom and religious discrimination and
disadvantage, and how they accommodate positive religious rights alongside civil rights such as
Religion, Politics and Governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania: An Overview 11
protection against discrimination on the basis of gender or sexuality.   Thus it is in the differentiated
polities, for example in the developed West, where principles of religious freedom are clearly
entrenched and least circumscribed, and the public right not to be discriminated against on grounds of
gender or sexuality has become a fundamental principle. In contrast, in integrated polities, while some
minority religious communities might well be self-governing, as under the millet system of the Turkish
Caliphate, the de jure recognition of civil rights is often heavily qualified, leading to asymmetrical
conceptions of citizenship  (Cf Parekh, 2000). As we shall see in the case of Nigeria, the right to
freedom of religion has been taken to mean diametrically opposite things by the Christian and Muslim
communities, with the political representatives of the latter using it to justify the introduction of shari’a
law in northern Nigerian states. However, it would be inappropriate to suggest that differentiation and
integration correspond only to a distinction between developed and developing nations: polities like
India have managed to combine religious and civic rights alongside some autonomy in personal
religious law (e.g. Muslim personal law), though as we shall see below, rightwing Hindu critics of this
arrangement have long campaigned that it militates against the idea of common citizenship.
Taking the framework outlined above as our organizing guide, how does it help us to understand the
encounter between religion and politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania since independence?
In what sense, if any, does differentiation and integration relate to the ‘return of religion’ in the public
sphere? And what does the ‘return of religion’ in public life tell us about the nature of contemporary
governance in these states?
Drawing on the historical analysis based on existing sources that was undertaken for the national
case studies (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009; Nolte et al, 2009; Waseem and Mufti, 2009; Nyirabu, 2009),
four dimensions will be highlighted: (i) the triumph of the secular state at independence; (ii) the crisis
of governance that affected all four states in the 1980s and 1990s and its impact on religious actors
and their relationships with the state; and (iii) an assessment of the current nature of governance
between religious actors and the state, given the benchmark of a secular state at independence.
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2.2 The ‘secular’ state at independence
It has almost become a conventional wisdom to argue that developing countries in the South have
witnessed the ‘decline of the secular state’; that is, the gradual erosion of the secular foundations of
the nationalist movements that triumphed at independence, and the slow mobilization of religious
actors and institutions (Haynes, 2007, Chs.10 and 12). However, such general narratives rarely
examine the particular conditions which produced this arrangement or the historical statecraft of state-
religion relationships which preceded it. In three of the four project countries (India, Nigeria and
Tanzania) there were specific considerations that made state secularism an attractive option.  In the
event, the nature of these country-specific secularisms was defined not ab initio but was the product
of historical and political compromises.16
In India, the post-1947 Gandhian-Nehruvian synthesis for managing religious diversity was shaped as
much by traditional Hindu statecraft as Nehru’s commitment to the secular ideal, a commitment
strengthened by the mass religious violence which accompanied the creation of Pakistan (Talbot and
Singh, 2009). As such, the Indian constitution of 1950 was very much an Indian compromise with the
forces of religion. Secularism as an idea found no mention in the constitution (it was inserted in 1976
as the result of a constitutional amendment), but neither did the constitution recognize an official
religion. Individual and collective freedom to worship and propagate religion was guaranteed and the
principal of non-discrimination on religious grounds established. The Muslim minority’s fears were
assuaged by the concession of Muslim Personal Law, though with a constitutional commitment to
move eventually towards a unified civil code that would embrace all religious communities. Taken
together, these provisions fulfilled at least three requirements of the secular state: religious equality,
religious liberty and state neutrality (Smith, 1967. Ch.4). And although no clear ‘wall of separation’ was
established between religion and the state, Indian secularism came to be characterized by what
Donald Eugene Smith, the distinguished scholar of Indian secularism, called the “no-preference
doctrine”, in which no “special privileges were to be granted to any one religion” (ibid., p. 381). The
‘non-preference doctrine’, or what Bhargava (1998) calls ‘principled distance’, according to Mahajhan
and Jodhka, “share the liberal imagination, even though the ideals cherished by liberals are realized
somewhat differently in the Indian context” (2009, p. 16). Yet the Indian context has been defined
primarily by a notion of Hindu tolerance, which has given Indian secularism its credo of ‘good will
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towards all religions’ (sarvadarma sadbha)  - a credo that is also open to non-liberal constructions and
illiberal imagination, as will be explored below (Singh, 2000, Ch.3).
Nigerian state secularism also emerged out of a specific historical context and particular
compromises. Foremost among these was the different traditions of governance under colonial rule in
the North (mainly Islamic and ruled indirectly) and the South (indigenous African religions, Christian
mission, and direct rule). In the North, which had been administered by religiously empowered Emirs
under British guidance, “Islam constituted the basis of local government, and Shari’a courts, which
had existed before colonial rule, were integrated into the colonial state” (Nolte el.al., 2009, p. 5).
Criminal laws were codified into secular law only just before independence and a Shari’a Court of
Appeal continued to exist in the Northern Region after 1960. In contrast, secularism as a creed was
championed in the South by Christians, who were the socially mobilizing groups which had benefitted
from modern education and direct colonial governance. Thus although secularism became the
grandnorm of Nigerian politics after 1960, it was highly contested, required the accommodation of
Muslim personal law, and would eventually lead to legal bifurcation of the state.
Similarly, Tanzanian state secularism after 1961 was integral to the nationalist movement, which came
to power with the specific project of national state-building through the civic-territorial conception of a
united national  identity.  This identity envisioned a form of social and economic development in which
all religious groups and communities would benefit by, among other things, equal access to education.
It was forged in opposition to tribal, ethnic and religious identities previously mobilized by the colonial
state.  Thus secularism, as in India, was perceived as a solution to the underlying problems of
managing diversity in a religiously polarized and divided society (Bakari, 2008).  However, like Nigeria,
secularism was closely associated with the Christian community, which had been the main
beneficiary of British colonial rule. The crafting of Tanzanian state secularism had to accommodate
some Muslim demands, especially Muslim personal law; and this exceptionalism was reinforced by
the merger with Zanzibar (1964), which retained its modes of Islamic governance.
Even in Pakistan, the creation of an Islamic Republic as a ‘homeland’ for Muslims failed to secure the
integration of Islam and the state. The modernist, statist leadership of the Pakistan movement led by
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, soon after the achievement of independence, articulated an almost secularist
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position that personal beliefs of the citizens were irrelevant: “In the new state of Pakistan [Jinnah had
declared]… everyone will be equal before the law, and people will cease to be Muslims and cease to
be Hindus, in the eyes of the law” (quoted in Malik, 2002, p.6)  Although the retreat from this position to
the first constitution (1956) - which decreed that no laws repugnant to Islam would be passed - was
gradual and inexorable, the statist regimes and controlling elite of Pakistan have always maintained a
rearguard resistance to Islam’s encroachment into the realm of the state. In so doing they have set up
a conflictual relationship between the state and Islam, in which “religion seeks to define, understand
and penetrate the state, while the latter attempts to make an instrument out of religion” (Waseem and
Mufti, 2009, p. 9).
Table 2 below provides a schematic presentation of the state-religion relationship at independence in
India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania.  It does not, of course, adequately capture the peculiarities of
state secularisms in India, Nigeria and Tanzania, or the statist accommodation of Islam in Pakistan,
but it does underscore the argument that most nationalist leaders at independence foresaw a minimal
role for religion in the public sphere – a perspective further reinforced by the intellectual and ideological
investment in economic development that, for most nationalist leaders at the time, was to be the
precursor of  societal secularization, in which the secular state would play a pre-eminent role (Brass,
1999). Indeed, in the first few decades after decolonization, it was ethnic and regional rather than
religious-based movements, such as Biafra, East Pakistan/Bangladesh and regional linguistic
movements in India, that threatened to undermine the national integration efforts in the newly
independent countries. It was only in the early 1980s, with the ‘crisis of governance’, that political
mobilizations around religious identities began to seriously call into question the legitimacy of the
secular state.
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Table 2: State-religion relationships at independence in Tanzania,
India, Nigeria and Pakistan







 Secular  
Freedom of religion; religious equality; 
state neutrality; right to change one’s 
religion; ban on religious political parties. 
Muslim and customary personal law 
Tanganyika African 
National Union (TANU) 
India Secular  
Sarva dharma sambhava (goodwill to all 
religions); freedom of religion; religious 
equality; state neutrality 
___________________ 
Muslim Personal Law 
Indian National Congress 
(INC); Communist Party of 
India (CPI); some national 
and regional parties 
Nigeria Secular 
Freedom of religion; religious equality; 
state neutrality. 
__________________ 
Muslim personal law; Shar’ia court of 
appeal in Northern Nigeria 
Nigerian People’s 
Congress (NCP); National 







Islam the state religion; no laws repugnant 
to Islam; Islamic Advisory Council. 
_________________ 
But the body of common law is ‘essentially 
secular’ and based on English Common 
Law 
Bureaucratic-military 





2.3 From a ‘crisis of governance’ to new roles for religions in public
life
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the post-colonial settlement in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania was under severe strain. Internal and external developments eroded confidence in the
secular nationalist project which had been so central to the legitimacy of secular elites. In the event,
this erosion was to result in fully-fledged crises of governance, creating new opportunities and spaces
for religions in public life.
The major factor triggering this crisis was the decline in the coalition of political forces that had
underpinned the post-colonial state from independence onwards. By the 1970s, if not earlier, the
developmental claims of these states were looking threadbare. Increasingly they came to resemble
what Brass has called “chappati-in-the-sky” (Brass, 1999, p. 36). As a consequence, the electorate
turned to other visions. In India, the Congress party lost its hegemony in 1977 after an experiment in
authoritarianism during a period of Emergency when the constitution was suspended; and in the
1980s and 1990s, the country witnessed the spectacular rise of the BJP against the background of
rising Hindu-Muslim communal violence which climaxed in the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque
(1992). In Tanzania, the secular civic-territorial model of national identity started to be increasingly
challenged by social and political identities rooted in ethnicity and religion (Campbell and Stein, 1991).
Deep resentment of TANU’s monopoly of political power and its ideology of Ujamaa (self-reliance)
ultimately led to the introduction of multi-party elections in 1992, though religious political parties
remained banned. In Pakistan and Nigeria, on the other hand, although ethnic conflicts (Biafra and
East Pakistan/Bangladesh) and problems of nation-building had thwarted the process of
democratization with early military intervention, these were followed by phases of democratization
(Nigeria 1974-83; Pakistan, 1971-77). However, in both countries rapid disillusionment with populist
politicians led to renewed bouts of military intervention (Pakistan 1977-88; Nigeria 1983-9917) that
would subsequently usher in overt attempts to integrate religion and the state.
The second major factor which contributed to the ‘crisis of governance’ by the early 1980s was
economic crisis, the impact of externally imposed structural adjustment policies and the pursuit of
economic liberalization ((Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009; Nolte et al, 2009; Waseem and Mufti, 2009;
Nyirabu, 2009). These polices, termed the ‘Washington consensus’, emphasized markets, de-
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regulation and the downsizing of the state, with non-state actors and agencies (including FBOs)
expected to play a greater role in service delivery. However, their immediate effect was to unravel the
social formations that undergirded the post-colonial political formations. Thus India’s pursuit of gradual
economic liberalization from the early 1980s onwards spurned a consumerist middle-class at the
expense of the peasantry and the petit-bourgeoisie, thereby unleashing the BJP’s project of
‘reinventing India’, which was imbued with religious nationalist fervour (Corbridge and Harris, 2000). In
Nigeria, the misuse of oil revenues, the crash in oil prices in 1981 and structural adjustment policies,
with their austerity measures and subsequent military takeover, brought about far-reaching changes in
Nigerian society marked by “social decay, state failure, massive corruption, endemic graduate
unemployment, environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region, unprecedented abuse of human
rights and crippling poverty among the masses” (Roberts, 2007, p.15). The ‘crisis of governance’ of
the 1980s and 1990s was to have profound implications for the state-religion relationship, as the
military regime promoted incremental Islamicization, in the process creating major difficulties for the
restoration of the status quo ante when democratic governance was again introduced in 1999 (ibid).
Similarly, in Tanzania the adoption of IMF imposed structural adjustment in 1986 had major
consequences for the alliance of social classes that depended on the social welfarism of Ujamaa.
These reforms made it necessary to “restructure political and social relations … creat[ing] the need to
redefine the nature of the state and its relationship with society, [and] in the process, new social forces
emerged, including some [that were] religiously inspired” (Nyirabu, 2009, p.25).  In Pakistan, too,
though a structural adjustment programme was not externally imposed, the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan (1979) and the subsequent flow of American aid reinforced the precarious hold of the Zia
regime on the state and encouraged it to pursue a course of Islamicization to strength its legitimacy,
as well as to ‘reinvent’ the idea of Pakistan an ‘authentic’ Islamic state (Waseem and Mufti, 2009).
Zia’s regime, as we shall see below, was to leave an enduring legacy, from which all subsequent
regimes (military and civilian) have struggled to distance themselves.
While the ‘crisis of governance’ created new spaces for the ‘return of religion’ to the public sphere in
the four countries, how did this return manifest itself in our four case study countries?  In what ways
did religion now encounter the state?
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Obviously it is not possible to discuss all the manifold dimensions of this process in the four countries,
but in line with the framework given above, four particular areas will be highlighted: (i) electoral
mobilization of religious demands by religious and non-religious parties in differentiated regimes; (ii)
statist co-option of religious demands by integrationist regimes; (iii)  the transformation of some
‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of revolution’ in both differentiated and integrationist regimes; and,
(iv), post 9/11, the need to address religious discrimination and disadvantage in both differentiated and
integrated regimes.
2.3.1 Electoral mobilization of  religious demands by religious and non-
religious parties in differentiated regimes
We have noted above that political parties have been the main institutions that have transmitted and
processed religious demands into political systems. In the four countries under study, this has been
accomplished by both religious and non-religious parties. In India, as Mahajan and Jodhka note, the
effectiveness of religious parties has been moderated because to achieve electoral success in a
democratic system, they have had to build coalitions beyond their own communities. Simultaneously,
however, majoritarian parties that appeal to the Hindu religious community (83 per cent of the
population), like the BJP, have been able to consolidate their constituencies by articulating a religio-
nationalist agenda. Since the early 1980s, the BJP has grown from a minor national party which could
secure only 2 seats and 7.7 per cent of the vote in the national parliamentary elections in 1984 to
become the dominant party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), securing 182 seats (25.5 per
cent of the vote) in the 1999 national elections. The BJP-led NDA governed from Delhi between 1999
and 2004. The BJP’s meteoric rise is often ascribed to India’s ‘crisis of governability’ (Kohli, 1990),
which enabled the ‘Hindutva wave’ to ‘reinvent India’.  In this wave, the BJP and its sister
organizations, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Prishad (VHP, or the World
Council of Hindus), unleashed mass mobilizations based on the demand to construct a Hindu temple
on the site of the Ajodhya mosque.  In a radical innovation, these mobilizations introduced new modes
of political pilgrimage, in which the nation was re-imagined in religious idioms, as well as remapped by
cross-country marches, often leading to well-planned physical confrontations with minority Muslim
communities (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000).
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These overt manifestations of Hindu pride gave vent to the long-repressed language of belonging,
while simultaneously tapping the heightened anxieties of upper- and middle-caste Hindus beset by
threats of affirmative action (for the lower castes) and economic liberalization (Singh, 2004).  While in
power, the BJP was unable to implement its three key election promises – to build a Hindu temple in
the place of the Ayodhya mosque, enact a uniform civil code (which would terminate Muslim personal
law) and  abolish article 370 of the constitution, which grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir.
However, during its tenure in office, the party was able to steer a number of policy changes that sought
to embed Hindutva values within Indian society. The need to reform the education system was used
as a pretext to revise the school curriculum in line with the more extreme elements of Hindutva
thought, based on the schooling model of the RSS. This was done by implementing a New National
Curriculum Framework and editing approved textbooks in ways that directly promote Hinduism as the
‘essence of Indian culture’ and describe other religions as ‘alien or invading faiths’, in flagrant violation
of Article 28 of the Constitution, which prohibits the teaching of  religion in educational institutions
managed out of state funds. In higher education, the major funding and research councils were
packed with BJP nominees. Among the more outlandish schemes were attempts to ‘Indianize,
nationalize and spiritualize’ higher education by seeking to impose the study of astrology and Vedic
science on universities. Vedic creationism, like the new enthusiasm for archaeological surveys, came
to be identified as means of authenticating Indian knowledge according to which, according to one
leading authority, India is to be viewed as “the true mother of all civilisations [that] produced all science
known to the Greeks and other ancient cultures” (Nanda, 2004, p.10).
Another area where there was a marked erosion of constitutional guarantees was the right to practise
and propagate one’s faith. These freedoms have always been subject to qualification by consideration
of public order, morality and health. The right to propagate one’s religion was reluctantly conceded at
the insistence of Christian members of the Constituent Assembly, although since 1950 a number of
states have passed legislation to regulate the activities of missionaries. Between 2002 and 2004,
under the intentionally mistitled ‘Freedom of Religion Bills’, state governments in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu
and Orissa have attempted to control religious conversions carried out by “force, fraud or allurement”
(Singh, 2004). Intended primarily to limit conversions of low-caste Hindus and tribes to Christianity,
Islam and Buddhism, this legislation requires that all conversions, individual or collective, be approved
by a District Magistrate, while severely penalizing conversions in response to inducements. There are
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some indications that this legislation – unlike most legislation in India – is being rigorously enforced,
with calls from the more extreme elements within the BJP for national anti-conversion legislation. It
remains to be seen whether the legislation will prove to be prohibitive or protective. What is clear,
however, is that in some states of the Indian Union, the District Magistrate has become the final arbiter
of religious conscience.
The principle of state neutrality in religious affairs was also compromised in other ways. Less serious
contraventions included efforts to introduce a national cow protection bill (2003) and to replace the
national anthem in state schools in India’s most populous state with religious songs. More worryingly,
the BJP and its sister organizations were implicated in organized pogroms. The events which unfolded
in the state of Gujarat in February 2002 after the murder of Hindus on a train in Godhra are too familiar
to be recounted again (Gupta, 2010). The facts speak for themselves: in state-wide riots, unofficial
reports estimate that almost 5,000 Muslims were killed and over 100,000 were displaced from their
homes and had to seek shelter in camps. The BJP state government in Gujarat and the police were
criticised for failing to stop the violence. In many instances the police clearly participated or
encouraged it; in some cases the police reportedly told Muslim victims ‘we have no orders to save
you’. Narinder Modi, the BJP Chief Minister of the state, who is identified with the militant faction of
Hindutva, remained unresponsive to national and international criticism of his government for fanning
the fires of hatred. Only when international pressure became an embarrassment did the central
government respond to censure its regional strap. Even then, this was done in a piecemeal way, with
the Prime Minister using an idiom which recalled the traditional obligations of the Hindu ruler to protect
raj dharma (religion). Critics argued that Modi’s inaction was influenced mainly by the impending state
elections, a desire to hang on to power by consolidating the Hindu vote; his more vociferous
supporters were less sanguine. For them Gujarat was a model for the rest of India (Singh, 2004).
Yet despite the BJP’s success, the party was unable to restructure the religion-state relationship in
India. The NDA’s constitutional commission, which was set up to review the working of the
constitution, proved to be a damp squib, and its  defeat in the 2004 parliamentary elections confirmed
the view that on its own the BJP would struggle to secure more than 25 per cent of the national vote.
While the potential for a Hindu majoritarian party to capture the state through elections remains, and
as we have seen in the case of Gujarat appears more realizable at the state level, in reality social,
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linguistic, religious, ethnic and caste divisions among Hindus operate to frustrate such an outcome.
Centrist politics remains the natural ground for Indian parties seeking national power (Rudolph and
Rudolph, 1987).
Unlike India, where electoral competition has facilitated the emergence of religious identity politics, in
Nigeria and Tanzania it has taken on a different dimension.  One reason for this is that religious parties
are banned in both states; another is that, like India to some extent, both Tanzanian and Nigerian
electoral politics operate against the emergence of a majoritarian national religious party a la BJP, at
least at the national level (Roberts, 2007; Mukandala et al, 2006).18 Consequently, the politicization of
religious identities in electoral competition has taken an intra-party form where, though national parties
appeal to religious constituencies for electoral support, they deflect the resonance of this appeal in
governance, which often requires consociational modes of power sharing, such as the federal
principle of proportionality in Nigeria and the balancing of religious representation in key appointments
in Tanzania (Nolte et al, 2009; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002).
Thus in Nigeria the use of religious symbols and identities in election campaigns has been common
since the late 1970s as, during periods of democratic rule, “politicians have urged their followers to
vote along religious lines” (Falola, 1998, p. 38).  This has been most explicit following episodes of
communal violence, as for example in Kaduna in 1987, when election campaigns have been
“conducted more in the churches and mosques by pastors and malams than by the contestants”
(Roberts, 2007, p. 29). In the Northern states, especially during the third republic, elections were more
of a religious exercise than a political one. During the 2003 general elections, for instance, Muhammed
Buhari, the presidential candidate of the All Nigerian  People’s party (ANPP), openly urged Muslims to
vote only for Muslim candidates, thereby stoking the ire of its rival the People’s Democratic Party
(PDP) and Anglican bishops, who asked the federal government to intervene.  Indeed, the
‘politicization of religion’ in elections has been a slow but a cumulative process, which has been
hastened by the rise of the petro-economy that centralized the country’s financial resources and the
crisis of governance since the 1980s. In fact some  analysts argue that politicians and political parties
now not only articulate the religious demands  of their constituents  but also have an incentive to
amplify and exaggerate religious differences to provoke communal conflicts, in order to increase their
chances of electoral success (Best, forthcoming; Ibrahim, 1997).19  Certainly the incidents of
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communal conflict that precede elections are indicative of growing polarization in certain localities
(Best, forthcoming).
In Tanzania the collapse of TANU’s Ujamaa ideology, economic liberalization and establishment of
multi-party politics has been followed by the rise of religious identities.  As Luanda (1996, p.168) has
noted,  at the “heart of the re-emergence of religion as an important factor in Tanzania politics is the
struggle between the Muslim and Christian establishments for pre-eminence in national affairs …[and]
for control of the secular state.”  This conflict centres on a Muslim critique of the post-independence
secular state as representing a form of Christian ‘hegemonic control’20 that has produced
discrimination and disadvantage for Muslims. The Muslim critique is countered by Christian responses
that Muslim organizations have sought to promote separatism and covert Islamicization, especially
over the issue of Zanzibar. However, this has not really been translated into electoral competition as in
India and Nigeria. To be sure, there is strong evidence that religious loyalties do, to some degree,
influence voting patterns between the two major parties Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic
United Front (CUF), and the competition between them in Zanzibar, which is overwhelmingly Muslim,
is very intense (Mallya, 2006). Nonetheless, these patterns coexist with cross-cutting cleavages, the
government’s promotion of the belief that there is parity in numbers of Muslims and Christians, and the
lack of group consensus within these communities - factors that all contribute to the success of
centrist catch-all parties like the CCM (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002).
2.3.2 Statist co-option of religious demands and organizations by
integrationist regimes
Of the four case study countries, the integrationist impulses have been strongest in Pakistan and
northern Nigeria. In the former, the modernist elite which led the movement for Pakistan has struggled
to adequately define ‘religion as a discourse of the state’, thus setting up a permanent conflictual
relationship between state and Islam. From independence to the mid-1970s, this relationship was
managed by statism, co-option and constitutional provisions that recognised the pre-eminence of
Islam in Pakistani society but skilfully skirted the need for an Islamic state (Waseem and Mufti, 2009,
pp.1-31).  However, from the late 1970s onwards there was something of a qualitative transformation,
as the crisis of governance identified above was compounded by the military takeover (1977), Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan (1979), and a legitimacy deficit resulting from the execution of the PPP
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leader, Zalfikar Ali Bhutto. It was in these circumstances that the regime of general Zia-ul-Haq
embarked on a programme of Islamicization as the authentic national identity for Pakistan. These
changes included:
…the establishment of Islamic banks, the provision for abolition of interest (riba), a
mandatory collection of social welfare tax (zakat) from Sunni bank-holdings, an Islamic
land tax (ushr) and various research institutions to study Islamic economy. Educational
reforms included the establishment of the International Islamic University and Sharia
Training Institute, enhancement of importance of Arabic in the curricula, and increase in
the Islamic content of textbooks. Social reforms stressed the sanctity of Ramadan,
enforcement of pre-existing bans on drinking alcohol and gambling as well as
encouraging women to wear the chaddar, little or no-make up in government offices, on
the television screen and in other workplaces. Legal reforms included establishment of
the Federal Sharia Court, parallel to pre-existing legal structures. Procedural reforms
included redrafting of the Law of Evidence whereby a woman’s testimony was reduced
to one-half of a man’s testimony. This led to severe opposition among women activists.
Eventually the draft was significantly different from the original Ordinance. Finally, four
new ordinances were introduced collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances, despite
being opposed by the liberal intelligentsia, progressive forces on the left of the centre and
activists from women and minority communities (Waseem and Mufti,  2009, pp.28-29).
Although Zia’s Islamicization drive was opposed by sections of the Shias, who viewed it as state-
backed Sunnification, the process had two long-term consequences for religion-state relationships in
Pakistan. First, it permanently shifted the balance towards Islam, as Zia vainly pursued the normative
ideal of ‘consensual integration’ (see Table 1). Consequently, notwithstanding post-Zia democratization
and General Pervaiz Musharraf’s ‘enlightened modernism’ (1999-2007), democratic and progressive
military regimes have struggled to de-Islamicize legislation and structures dating from this era.  In fact,
the terms of trade in political discourse in Pakistan were permanently altered in favour of Islamicization
(Aziz, 2008).
Second, Islamicization has also produced a well-entrenched Islamic establishment comprising
religious parties, seminaries, transnational organizations, non-state actors and Jihadists, which has
“one step in the system and the other out of it” (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p.7).  Historically, religious
parties and organizations in Pakistan were characterized by a Jacobean drive for state power, but
successive periods of military rule have nurtured a mullah-military alliance (Haqqani, 2005) that has
led to the development of an Islamic establishment with a “structural presence of its own [with]
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multiple links with the state characterized by patronage, parallelism and hostility” (Waseem and Mufti,
2009, p.11).  This establishment has now produced a powerful counter-narrative to the idea of
Pakistan, one that pushes it to its logical conclusion as an Islamic state. According to Waseem and
Mufti (2009, p. 33-34), the Islamic establishment is such a major player in society and politics that it
operates in four settings: organizational, sectarian, educational and iconoclastic. The success of
religious parties in 2002 in electing an MMA provincial government in the NWFP marked a decisive
breakthrough (its achievements will be discussed in Section 3).
Like Pakistan, integrationist pressures have also been present in Nigeria’s northern states, which have
pre-colonial histories of Islamic polities and jurisprudence (Nolte et al, 2009). In some of these states,
there have also been calculated efforts to turn the conflictual relationship between religion and the
state into a cooperative one (see Table 1) by the introduction of shari’a law. This process began with
the introduction in 1999 of shari’a law in the state of Zamfara for civil and criminal cases. It was
subsequently extended to eleven other Muslim-majority states, despite the opposition from southern
politicians, non-Muslims in these states and riots (e.g. in Kano state in October 2001, which led to the
deaths of 100 people). At the end of 2009, shari’a law was still in force in many of the northern states
and, despite some signs of declining support among Muslims, there is little indication that the state
governments are likely to abolish it.
The introduction of shari’a in these states has been accompanied by efforts to curtail the religious
freedom, citizenship rights and political activities of non-Muslims.  As Nolte et al observe of Kano with
reference to the state’s Christians:
The state government is tightly controlled by Muslims, and there are currently no
Christians in elected positions at state level and very few in high or mid-level
administrative posts. Generally, the Christians in Kano are marginalized and do not take
part in decision-making. Christian organizations are not subject to direct government
control, but the government may request compliance with state policies and regulations
from their schools and other institutions. Kano state government has often prevented
Christian groups from acquiring land for the building of churches or other buildings that
might be put to religious use, and Christians are not only prevented from airing their
programmes on state-controlled television and radio stations, but also on private and
federally-owned stations which broadcast in Kano State (2009, pp.31).
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In addition to these formal and informal pressures, non-Muslims are expected to observe the Islamic
moral code, including the wearing of head scarves by Christian schoolgirls, and to accept
discriminatory practices, including penal taxation on the activities of Christian organization (ibid).
Needless to say, many critics of Nigerian secularism now argue that the introduction of shari’a in
northern Nigeria has created a bifurcated polity that increasingly resembles a ‘Muslim north’ and
‘Christian south’ division in the country (Roberts, 2007, pp.1-18), though it needs be recognized that
the application of shari’a  extends only to private and penal law.
2.3.3 Transformation of some ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of
revolution’ in both differentiated and integrationist regimes
Contemporary encounters between religion and the state go beyond merely electoral or statist
responses: in both differentiated and integrated regimes, changes in state policies (as result of the
‘crisis of governance’, among other things) and changes in religious theologies and practices (as
result of new ideas and outlooks, especially among transnational religious communities in an age of
globalization and diaspora activism) have transformed ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of
revolution’.21 Some of these ‘revolutions’ have been crushed with unremitting force (India and Nigeria);
others continue to threaten the very viability of the state (Pakistan and Tanzania).22
In differentiated regimes such as India, the radicalization of religion as a revolutionary agent has been
most pronounced in ethno-religious movements (Sikhs, Kashmiris and the Nagas) (Bose, 2003;
Franke, 2009; Singh, 2000). In the 1980s, religion “surfaced as a central concern and set Punjab’s
political and cultural agenda” (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p.32), creating a militant secessionist
movement in India’s richest province that led to the deaths of 25,000 people between 1984 and 1993
(Singh, 2000, Ch.10). Although the movement was ruthlessly crushed by using overwhelming force to
‘restore normalcy’, it has left a bitter legacy which retains the potential for ‘reinvention’ (Singh, 2009).
Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s the Jammu and Kashmir  ethno-separatist movement, which had
dated from independence, assumed an increasingly Islamist colour as ex-Afghan Muhujadin  jihadists,
and Pakistani irregulars turned a resistance movement into a full-scale uprising that resulted in the
loss of 60,000 lives (Bose, 2003).  As in Punjab, this insurgency was contained by using overwhelming
force - a strategy regularly used by the Indian state against Christian insurgents in the north-eastern
states (Baruah, 2010).
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In Pakistan, though the contemporary Islamist challenge to the state has an underlying regional
dimension (the insurgency in Afghanistan), it also has two other aspects.  First, the insurgency
represents radical groupscules within the Islamic establishment, which have been engaged in direct
action since the army assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad (2007), and which have historically
nurtured the ‘Pakistan Taliban’. Second, the vertical divisions within the Islamic establishment are also,
in some measure, being transformed into horizontal mobilizations in which Islam serves as a radical
ideology of revolt centred on traditional grievances that include discrimination, underdevelopment and
centuries of feudal oppression. Thus it has been convincingly argued that one of the reasons why
militants were able to make such impressive inroads into the Swat Valley was because of the
cumulative failure of the Pakistan state to establish sound governance after the end of Wali’s rule. This
failure had been so systemic that the ‘Pakistan Taliban’-inspired movement had all the characteristics
of a subaltern ‘uncivic rebellion’, in which Islamic radicalism was a rejection of modernity, but also
included a plea for effective governance (Geiser, 2010). The same development appears to be taking
place in the districts of southern Punjab (e.g. Dera Gazi Khan, Bhalwalpur) where Islamic radicals are
beginning to effectively mobilize the poor peasantry and agricultural labourers, who have traditionally
existed within a feudal moral universe (Aziz, 2010).  In short, Islamic radicalism ‘from below’ of the
poor and oppressed, who might be mobilized horizontally, potentially holds a far more serious
existentialist threat to Pakistan statehood than a vertically organized Islamic establishment, which has
demonstrated a propensity to accept state-led integration.
In Nigeria, too, radical Islamist movements in the northern states have attempted to raise the banner of
revolt by seeking to mobilize ‘from below’ while competing against the appropriation of their demands
by the traditional aristocracy. The Maitatsine riots in Kano, for instance, were a peasants’ revolt against
Muslim aristocrats that led to thousands of deaths between 1979 and 1985 (Roberts, 2007, p. 22).
According to Haynes (1995, p.527), these riots were not simply an “outbreak of Islamic
fundamentalism, but rather an eruption of the ‘have nots’ against the ‘haves’.”  Most recently, the Boko
Haram group, which supported direct action, was involved in a confrontation with security forces in
which several hundred people were killed (Vanguard, 28 July 2009).23 Indeed, as Nolte et al (2009)
have clearly demonstrated, in northern Nigeria, especially Kano, the process which led to the
introduction of shari’a has been undergirded by a class struggle between the traditional landed
aristocracy, with its support for Sufi and indigenized Islam, on the one hand and, since the Iranian
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revolution, the rise of Arabist scriptural Islam supported by transnational movements such as the
Muslim Brotherhood, on the other.  The latter (Izala) has sought to outflank the former, with followers
mainly from the poor or poorly represented groups of society, including students, women and petty
traders. These social differences between Izala and Sufi groups, moreover, “are reflected in their
different approaches to religious and political practices, with the Izala’s  strongly egalitarian ethos
reflected in its consistent campaign for shari’a law in order to address the ills perceived to be present
in society” (ibid., p.35).24 Overall, these social differences among the Muslim sects in northern Nigeria
provide interesting clues as to why some have pursued the path of direct action, others gradual
mobilization by highlighting the idiom of equality, and still others have sought to steal the clothes of the
Islamists by advocating shari’a law as a universal panacea.  Interestingly it is among the Arabist Izala
followers that the support for shari’a  is strongest (84 per cent), while for other Muslims it is modest
(59 per cent) (ibid., p.36).
2.3.4 Post-9/11, religious discrimination and disadvantage in
differentiated and integrated regimes
Finally, the consequences of the ‘return of religion’ in the four countries under study are also clear in
the emergence, in both differentiated and integrated regimes, of discourses and policy responses to
claims of religious discrimination and disadvantage. To some extent this is the outcome of the human
rights and ‘good governance’ agendas that have promoted religious, gender and cultural liberties
(UNDP, 2004).  At the same time, we need to acknowledge the impact of 9/11, which has led some of
these states to reassess their policies towards religious minorities in order to better promote social
integration and community cohesion. Together, these developments have introduced a greater
sensitivity to the religious idiom, as well as innovations for how better to frame public policy.25
Since 2004, such changes are most apparent in India. The election of a Congress government was
followed by the establishment of the Sachar Committee on the social, economic and educational
status of the Muslim community. The committee’s findings provided the first systematic analysis of the
significant under-representation of Muslims in public life and government services, as well as their
underachievement in such areas as education. It also highlights the Indian state’s failure to allocate
adequate resources to achieve development objectives in localities of Muslim concentration,
particularly in the rural areas (Government of India, 2006). As a consequence of the Sachar
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Committee report, a range of policy initiatives have been developed to improve Muslim uptake of
primary and secondary education, target development resources to Muslim majority districts, and
develop equalities and anti-discrimination legislation that can create a framework for tackling religious
marginalization and systemic discrimination (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2010).  Despite the reservations of
some, who argue that these measures are intended to rekindle Congress’s historic electoral
relationship with Indian Muslims, it is generally recognized that the initiatives mark a fundamental
change in the Indian state’s policy framework towards religious minorities (Singh, forthcoming).
There have been debates about Muslim socio-economic disadvantage since before independence in
Tanzania, although the state has not undertaken a wholesale review a la Sachar Committee.26
Muslims have consistently argued “with evidence, that they [are] discriminated against” (Njozi, 2000, p.
7), particularly in terms of access to education, public sector employment and political office. The
consequences of gradual democratization, the ‘war on terror’ and Islamic revivalism amongst a
minority of Muslims, mainly in urban areas and Zanzibar, are that their concerns are now being
articulated in political discourses that are difficult to ignore. For example, the Muslim youth in Zanzibar,
which has been radicalized by global Islam, is increasingly adopting the language of human rights in
seeking to articulate an ‘alternative Islam’, one that is not controlled by the official religious
establishment (Turner, 2008).  Muslims FBOs like BARAZA KUU, moreover, now openly argue that
there is “a critical faith imbalance [in which] the country is ruled under a Christian hegemony which
promotes Islamophobia” (Bakari, 2008, p.12). Indeed,  instead of perpetuating this alleged hegemony,
which regularly constructs all Muslim demands for reform as a threat to national integration, some
Muslim organizations argue that there is need to  accommodate religious difference “in the context of
emerging realities of multiculturalism.” In essence, what is required according to them is the
creation of new institutional arrangements and practices that would allow the
accommodation of diverse interests, political accountability and good governance so as
to ensure equality and justice in a society [with] diverse identities, including religious ones
(Ibid., p. 33).
There are also echoes of similar discourses and institutional innovations in Nigeria.  Interestingly,
competing constructions of the freedom of religion, particularly article 38(1) of the 1999 constitution,
have been used to legitimize the introduction of shari’a  law in the twelve northern states on the
grounds that this is a collective exercise of the right. Such an interpretation has been highly contested
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by non-Muslims, who have argued that shari’a law inhibits their freedom of religion and compromises
state secularism.  Yet these sharp differences belie balancing mechanisms between the communities,
including the principle of religious proportionality that has been increasingly adopted at both local state
and federal levels.  In addition, there are innovations, mechanisms and practices at federal, state and
local levels that aim to promote inter-religious cooperation, as a palliative to endemic religious
conflicts.  In 2001, a federal Nigerian Inter-religious Council was established. In the south west, where
“Muslim and Christian organizations closely engage and compete with each other” (Nolte et al, 2009,
p.102), there have been inter-religious initiatives since the early 20th century.  Indeed, “Nigeria’s current
politics illustrate fascinating social, political and theological processes that may help the state to
develop a more satisfying form of multi-religious practice” that are consistent with its broader claims of
commitment to equity and justice (ibid).
Finally, in integrationist regimes such as Pakistan following 9/11, external pressure has been exerted
to arrest, if not reverse, the incremental Islamicization of the polity. This pressure has been most
evident in efforts to reform madrasa education, promote gender rights and respect the rights of
religious minorities (Bano, 2007). Formally at least, the state has attempted to respond to these
concerns from the donor agencies and multinational organizations. However, these policy agendas
have stoked the ire of the Islamic establishment and its allies as anti-Islamic, and not unexpectedly, in
Pakistan (and northern Nigeria), as we shall see in the detailed case study of the MMA below, the drive
by development agencies and international organizations for gender equality is all too frequently
understood as a conscious attempt to discredit Islam.
2.4 Religion, politics and governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania today
Clearly since independence the relationship between religion, politics and governance in the four
countries under study has been radically transformed. The most striking change has been erosion of
the secularist hegemony that commanded the towering heights of the post-independence state. Fifty-
to-sixty years on, the political formations which guided these states to independence no longer hold
sway, or have been substantially reinvented; even the ‘robust’ secularist states such as India and
Tanzania have faced formidable challenges, and today their continued commitment to sharing the
‘liberal imagination’ rests more on their internal social diversity - that militates against a dominant,
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religiously homogenizing centre - than deeply entrenched secularist values among the citizenry. Of the
other two countries, Nigeria remains a secularist state in name only, while its polity has been de facto
bifurcated along religious lines, and Pakistan’s secularist state elites are presently engaged in a bitter
civil war against Islamists for the survival of the state. Pakistan’s post-1947 history illustrates most
dramatically the emergence of political and social formations that have rejected the secularist efforts
to privatize religion. However, as we have seen in Nigeria, India and Tanzania, alternative forms of
mobilization by religious actors – electoral, statist infiltration, politics of resistance -  have substantially
undermined the post-independence civic conception of citizenship, as Islamicization, shari’a  law,
‘freedom of religion’ legislation, customary laws and proportionality have introduced asymmetric
religious rights, often against bitter opposition from religious opponents and secularists. In short, the
‘return of religion’ in these four polities is much more than merely symbolic:  above all, it has
permeated the political idiom in which ideas, movements and discourses about  identity and
disadvantage are now increasingly constructed as a zero-sum game by one religious community vis-
à-vis others.
The future direction of change in religion, politics and governance in the four polities is presented in
Table 3.
Table 3: Types of differentiation and exemplars: India, Pakistan,
Nigeria and Tanzania today
 
 Kind     Consensual    Conflictual 




India      






    Nigeria      
    (Northern states 
    with shari’a) 
         Pakistan 
 
    Direction of change 
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In India, although the challenge of Hindutva has been arrested, for the time being at least, it is likely
that as long as the BJP remains as the major national party, it would be premature  to rule out an
electoral assertion against state secularism. Similarly, in Tanzania the process of democratization, if it
takes firm roots, could undermine the one-party domination of the CUM, enabling the CUF to emerge
as a potential alternative for those seeking more active engagement of faiths in governance – Muslim
or otherwise. In Nigeria, the overall direction of change is far more complex: on the one hand, the
northern states have moved to a more consensual accommodation between religion and the state,
while on the other, the non-shari’a states retain a strong commitment to state secularism.  In these
conditions, we can neither rule out a greater polarization between these positions (with demands for
shari’a in other states and demands by non-Muslims for a more differentiated polity committed to
secularism), nor a gradual movement towards a conflictual differentiation (if support for shari’a in the
northern states wanes and non-Muslim political formations are more accommodative and pursue a
less strident secularism).   Equally, in Pakistan today, while the momentum is with the mobilizing
groups that demand consensual integration of religion and the state, the Pakistani army and the civic
state establishment - which have regularly disarticulated the demand for an Islamic state - may well
succeed in defeating the Islamist challenge.  Even such an outcome, however, is unlikely to provide an
enduring solution: at best it may restore the permanent antagonism between an increasingly
Islamicized society and a modernist state elite.
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3 Case studies of religious actors: patterns of
contemporary governance
Many of the changes identified above can be more contextually analysed through detailed case
studies. In this section, the case study materials are drawn on to analyse what engagement in the
political process means for religious actors, especially their poor and women members; to identify the
role of religious actors as obstacles to and levers of change for development; and to identify within
religious actors’ relationships with the state and broader processes of governance entry points for
potential pro-poor change.  These very broad issues will be reviewed by evaluating the case study
material with special reference to:
 mobilizations by marginalized religious communities in a differentiated political polity to secure
‘development goods’ i.e. representation in affirmative action programmes (India)
 the development performance of religious parties in an integrated polity (Pakistan)
 the role of religious organizations (ROs) in differentiated and integrated polities in advocacy and service
delivery (Nigeria)
 the role of ROs in a differentiated polity (Tanzania)
 the record of religious actors in promoting inclusive development and governance that engages the poor
and women  (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)
 the contribution of religious actors  to transforming contemporary governance to provide new
frameworks of engagement in politics (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania).
3.1 Marginalized religious communities and political mobilization
(India)27
It was noted in Section 2 that one of the key variables determining religious actors’ engagement with
the political system is their religious ideas and outlook. In India, there is an interesting example of
political mobilization by religious communities which view their identity both as a signifier of
‘victimization’ and a ‘resource’ for their liberation. This paradox arises because all the major religious
communities of Indic origin - Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Sikh – have the cross-cutting
cleavage of caste, a system of endogamous social hierarchy.28  Low caste groups within these
religious traditions, often referred to as Dalits,29 are doubly marginalized: within their own religious
communities - notwithstanding that some of these, such as Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, profess an
egalitarian creed - and as victims of social exclusion and economic deprivation. Historically, these
communities have eked out a miserable existence at the margins of Indian society, but after the social
reform movements of the early 20th century they developed an antagonistic outlook towards the
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dominant religious traditions with which they were conventionally associated, especially Hinduism.
They did so by evolving alternative social visions or, indeed, new religiously-based social movements
that aim to transcend religious and social inequality (Juergensmeyer, 1988; Jodhka and Kumar, 2010).
From the middle of the twentieth century, social mobilization by these movements coincided with a
political response from the Indian state in the form of affirmative action programmes, though initially
these programmes were restricted only to former Hindu low caste and tribal groups (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes).30 Since 1950, the scope of affirmative action programmes has been
extended to include Other Backward Castes/Classes (OBCs), which include Dalit groups among non-
Hindus, including Muslims. Because of the size of the Dalit groups (which make up more than 50 per
cent of India’s population), incentive structures have thereby been created for political parties to
mobilize these communities. Ironically, as we shall see, such mobilizations have also created a
dynamic interplay between community identities and interests (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, pp.55-68).
For Dalit communities, religion has always provided the mainspring of engagement in politics to build a
new social vision without discrimination and disadvantage (Juergensmeyer, 1988). At the same time
this vision, especially since 1947, has been part of a ‘plebeian assertion’ to secure Dalit interests in a
political system still dominated by the higher castes (Jaffrelot, 2009). These tensions between Dalit
communities’ identity and the dilemma of how to articulating their interests politically are insightfully
explored by Mahajan and Jodhka (2009) in three case studies.
In the first case, Dalit Muslims in Maharashtra successfully mobilized to secure employment and
educational opportunities. However, an animated debate arose among them about whether community
identity was compromised by participating in caste-based reservation – a social system closely
identified with Hinduism. Groups in favour of reservation were opposed by religious leaders and the
Ulemas “who wrote in religious journals… [and] some even went to the extent of issuing fatwas
against people working on the OBC issue” (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p.60). This formidable
opposition was eventually overcome by engaging with the leaders in mosques and villages in ways
that demonstrated to them the benefits of such participation. Indeed, so successful was this internal
campaign, according to Mahajan and Jodhka, that the militant Hindu nationalist regional party, Shiv
Sena, even attempted to co-opt the movement, notwithstanding its anti-Muslim stance, and even
acceded to its demands that an individual’s OBC status – the need to confirm that a person is of this
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category – be confirmed by a local rather than state official (ibid., pp. 55-68).  In mobilizing in this way,
OBC Muslims were actually knocking at an open door, because most of the major parties and the
state government responded positively to their demands. Perhaps more significantly, this mobilization
‘from below’, it is suggested, strengthened communal civic engagement that thwarted the potential
sectarian backlash (against Muslims) following terrorist outrages in Mumbai in 2004 and 2008.
The second case study from the state of Punjab demonstrates that narrow competition between
political parties (secular and religious) can encourage political formations in India to be responsive to
Dalit demands. In this case, the Congress party sought to divide the political constituency of its main
rival, the Shromani Akali Dal (SAD), by increasing the reservation of Dalit Sikhs. Although this
manoeuvre failed to deliver the necessary political dividend in the subsequent election, it established
an entrenched Dalit stake in sharing the state’s reservations, which all subsequent state governments
(Congress or SAD) were unable to reverse (ibid. pp. 46-54).
The third case study, again from Maharashtra, describes an exceptional case of an ex-Dalit
community that has benefitted from affirmative action programmes over a considerable time. It aims
to realise its social vision by constructing an alternative religious identity (Buddhism), while using its
resources (size, development, access to state institutions) to advance its agenda and mitigate
discrimination against community members. This twin strategy is predicated on the assumption that
genuine equality can be achieved only by changing one’s religion and that self-development is the
necessary logical step after affirmative action. Both strategies aim to build a self-empowered
community conscious of the liberating potential of religious identity and the weakness of dependence
on state largesse. Again, the size of this community in Maharashtra ensures that the leading political
parties remain responsive to its demands (ibid., pp. 69-82).
In general, Mahajan and Jodhka offer five propositions from the Indian case studies. The first is that in
a differentiated polity the structures of governance (and social diversity) can create a dynamic
engagement between politics and religious communities which operates against the emergence of
essentialist politics or communities. Second, related to this, such dynamic engagement can also help
to frame the internal discourses within religious communities that sometimes accentuate divisions
between progressive and traditional tendencies. Third, democracy also creates incentives for political
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parties to be responsive to marginal groups like the Dalits, though of course, this is determined by
their size and political significance.  Fourth, in a differentiated polity religious parties, either at state
level (e.g. SAD, Shiv Sena) or national level (e.g. BJP), are unable to consolidate their constituency
behind the idea of a monolithic ‘community’ because of cross-cutting cleavages of caste and the
existence of competitive non-religious parties. And finally, religious identity remains the mainspring of
political mobilization for religious communities, even when they decide to change or ‘reinvent’ their
identity (ibid., pp. 83-4).
3.2 The development performance of religious parties in an
integrated political system (Pakistan)
Religious political parties, as was noted in Section 1, are often the main institutions for aggregating
religious demands in a political system. In differentiated polities, such as India, these parties are
regularly checkmated by competition from non-religious parties. In integrated polities, in contrast,
religious political parties can be either anti- or pro-system. In the case of Pakistan, they have played
these roles simultaneously because they are part of what Waseem and Mufti (2009) call the
amorphous, multi-faceted ‘Islamic establishment’ that wages an unrelenting struggle against the
modernist idea of Pakistan, but also provides succour to military regimes against democratic
consolidation. Prone to electoral marginalization during periods of democratization, historically these
parties have thrived under military regimes because of their ideology and capacity for street
mobilization. In 2002, against the backdrop of war in Afghanistan and the unpopular military regime of
General Pervez Musharraf, the MMA achieved a notable electoral success, winning in the NWFP and
establishing a strong presence in Baluchistan, Sindh and the National Assembly.  In the event, the
MMA coalition was allowed to form the provincial government in the NWFP because the idea of  ‘mulla
(cleric) in’ office was deemed preferable to ‘mulla out’ because the latter was fraught with the risk of
anti-government mobilizations (ibid., p. 15) . The success of the MMA provides an exceptional case
study to examine the degree to which it was able to implement its policies and to review any
substantive difference in governance during its five years in office.
Although the MMA fought the 2002 election on a broad range of issues, including improving governance
and development, its key plank was Islamicization. One of its leaders admitted that “We want to
enforce a complete Islamic system, [which according to him is] the perfect code of human rights, one
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which guarantees justice, security and peace for all citizens and protects their honour and
employment” (The News, 28 October 2001). This vision was seen to be in consonance with the
constitutionally sanctioned Council of Islamic Ideology and to promise a form of ‘Islamic welfare state’
that would be realized by working within the existing constitution (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p.44).
Soon after the elections, the MMA pursued a vigorous policy of Islamicization that included: the
banning of alcohol, gambling, and audio and video cassettes; the appointment of women
coaches for women athletes; the appointment of female doctors for women; declaring Friday a
public holiday; and the introduction of Qur’anic studies in primary and secondary schools, interest
free banking and punishments such as rajm (stoning to death) and qatt-e-yadd (amputating
hands).  These measures were consolidated in the passing of the Shari’a Bill (2003), which
envisaged the further wholesale Islamicization of society to include education and the judiciary. To
establish an executive authority to enforce this process, the Hasba (accountability) Bill (2006)
was passed, creating a parallel administrative structure with an ombudsman likened to a
“Taleban style vice and virtue department” (Dawn, 3 May 2003). Although both these bills were
subsequently rejected by the Pakistan Supreme Court, in passing these measures the MMA
contributed significantly to creating an atmosphere of intolerance and radical change, in which its
opponents were regularly castigated as anti-Islamic (ibid., pp. 44-45).
Not only did the MMA’s Islamicization project became ensnared in constitutional and legal challenges
(the bills were referred by the NWFP governor to the President and the Supreme Court), its record on
development and governance was equally unimpressive. Notwithstanding the fact that provincial
autonomy in Pakistan (and India) is heavily circumscribed by the centralization of constitutional and
financial powers at the federal level (federal transfers in 2005-06 accounted for 92 per cent of NWFP’s
total revenue receipts), the MMA introduced few innovations. Its period in office saw a modest increase
in primary education enrolment (from 33 per cent in 2000-01 to 40 per cent in 2004-05), immunization
for children aged 22-23 months (57 per cent in 2000-01 to 76 per cent in 2004-05), and ante-natal
coverage of women (from 34 per cent in 2000-01 to 39 per cent in 2004-05). There was a substantial
increase in the budget devoted to medical care (from Rs 80 million in 2000-01 to 170 million in 2004-
5), but it was unaccompanied any major improvements in the quality of health care. In allocating
development funds, the MMA sought to target its own localities on the grounds that they were least
developed, but its opponents accused the coalition of engaging in the worst form of ‘pork-barrel
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politics’. Comparative analysis of MMA’s development initiatives in health care and education in three
districts underscore the view that the coalition lacked a clear vision of development and operated very
much according to traditional patron-client networks in seeking to consolidate and extend its support
base (Ibid., p. 49).
Nor was the MMA’s record of dealing with Musharraf’s military administration in Islamabad strikingly
different from previous patterns of mullah-military cooperation (see Haqqani, 2005). In spite of deep
popular resentment of military rule, in the name of ‘pragmatism’, of appearing to adjust to the ‘realities
of power’, the coalition provided strategically vital support to Musharraf’s questionable attempt to
extend his tenure in office through a Legal Framework Order. Although this decision was camouflaged
in rhetorical attacks against ‘militarism’, most serious observers viewed MMA’s decision as a quid pro
quo for the intelligence agencies’ assistance in the 2002 elections.  Indeed, that the MMA was widely
perceived as the military’s poodle, which barked loudly to keep anti-Americanism after 9/11 at bay, was
further illustrated by its dismal performance in the February 2008 provincial and national elections.
Genuinely regarded as the first ‘free and fair’ elections since the 1990s, they witnessed the landslide
return of mainstream provincial and national parties, reducing the MMA-based religious parties to their
nominal representation (from 45 seats in the National Assembly in 2002 to 7 in 2008, and from 68
seats in the NWFP provincial assembly in 2002 to only 14 in 2008), which has characterized most of
Pakistani politics since 1947.
The pervasive inability of the MMA to deliver more effective governance was evident in a relatively
critical assessment of its performance in other key areas.  As we shall see below, the administration
arrested, if not reversed, processes aimed at promoting gender equality. At the same time, its promise
to reduce corruption remained just that: a promise. “One of the biggest disappointments felt by the
people”, note Waseem and Mufti, “was that the MMA government was as, if not more, corrupt than
previous governments” (2009, p. 50). In summing up the MMA’s record - and the Pakistani experience
of governance by religious parties - Waseem and Mufti (pp. 9-10) conclude that:
Engagement in public life exposes religious forces to requirements [of] high moral
standards, as defined by the corruption-accountability nexus, human rights regime, and
the particular situation of women and minorities. ..the record of Islamic parties in
Pakistan has been dismal on these counts. Faith –based groups have failed to act as
drivers of social change. Their short-term objectives of acquiring and using
power…thrived on the politics of identity at the grave cost of politics of issues and
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policies. They have generally shied away from seeking to remove impediments to
development and reform, including economic, social and gender inequality, patterns of
feudal authority, and elitism in general. Islamists have lacked not only the will to challenge
the structures of domination, but also the potential for joining agencies of change, such
as political parties, civil society or the media, beyond the confines of religious politics.
Despite this powerful indictment we cannot exclude the possibility, however tenuous, that the MMA, by
consolidating the Islamist political infrastructure in the region, was also twin-tracking in nurturing
‘uncivic rebellions’ by the ‘Pakistani Taliban’.  There appears to be limited direct evidence for this
conjecture, but the fallout in the NWFP since the Pakistan Army’s crackdown in Swat (May 2009) does
lend some credence to the argument. Yet in the absence of convincing evidence, and in the light of
overwhelming historical experience, it would seem reasonable to suggest that religious political parties
in Pakistan remain the military’s one strategic asset in governance. In short, they are destined to play
the role of the ideological storm troopers of conflictual integration.
3.3 Religious organizations in advocacy and service delivery in
differentiated and integrated polity (Nigeria)
Religious political parties are constitutionally outlawed in some political systems, such as Nigeria and
Tanzania.  While this prohibition fails to excise completely the presence of religious demands within
the political system, some of the more common functions associated with these parties are
undertaken by other religious organizations. Unlike India and Pakistan, Christian organizations in many
African countries play a major role in advocacy and service delivery, particularly education and health
care, where historically they have had a strong comparative advantage. Although madrasa education
is widely provided in Muslim areas, Muslim FBOs play a smaller role in the provision of healthcare and
education because of their size and history. Given this different context, therefore, how do the ROs
encounter the state? What underpins their motivations to engage with the public realm? And what is
their contribution to ‘good governance’?
In Nigeria, as Nolte et al (2009) demonstrate, broadly speaking ROs’ interactions with the state are
framed by two dimensions. First, they may occupy a position as critical religious actors who share a
common religious vocabulary that seeks to promote justice and equality through good governance by
emphasizing structural development, education and health care. In this sense, ROs are more than a
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prophetic voice: they articulate alternative visions of development, often around aspects of service
delivery, which highlight Nigerian state failure. Second, as in India and Pakistan, the effectiveness of
ROs is mediated by the structures of governance in which they operate. These include: the historical
tradition, the centralization of political power at the federal level, the new hierarchies of social inclusion
and exclusion centred around ethnicity, indigeneity,31 the federal character principle (consociational
proportionality), and the asymmetrical size of some of the religious communities (Christian and
Muslim) that the ROs represent at the state and local levels. These complexities have given Nigeria an
unusual quality, as a polity in which elements of both a differentiated (south/middle) and an integrated
(north) relationship between religion and the state co-exist. But they also provide rich evidence of
innovations at the State level that might have significant implications for religions, politics and
governance in the future.
In three detailed case studies for this research, Nolte et al provide new insights into state-FBO
relationships. The case studies were located in Kano (a Muslim majority state), Anambra (a Christian
majority state) and Oyo (a mixed Christian-Muslim state). Their findings outline how FBOs’
interactions with the states are deeply braided with Nigeria’s growing crisis of governability.
Kano, the historic centre of Islam in northern Nigeria, is the main exemplar of integrationist politics.
Here the landed aristocracy, which has traditionally dominated the politics of the state, welcomed the
introduction of shari’a in 2000, to disarticulate a challenge ‘from below’ from more radical Islamic
formations.  Nolte et al found that in Kano, some Muslim ROs are well-integrated into the state
system, with close access to State representatives and State government responsiveness to their
demands.  Radical or critical Muslim groups, on the other hand, are effectively marginalized, resulting
in a vicious cycle of radicalization in which they understand their exclusion primarily in religious terms,
accusing the aristocratic leadership of the State of being unIslamic  (ibid. p. 25).  This exclusionary
approach is coupled with strict control of Christian ROs, which has resulted in non-representation and
penal taxation on their activities. Some Christian ROs are “suspected not only of making a profit but of
‘making money out of religion’, i.e. of acting in non-pious and selfish ways” (ibid., p. 22).  Christian
ROs, moreover, are seen as representing non-indigenes’ (in-migrants’) interests, because Kano
Christians constitute “a clearly identifiable group of potentially threatening outsiders” (ibid., p. 17).
Overall, according to Nolte el al,
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…the activities of the FBOs[ROs] interviewed in Kano state are...similar …Despite these
similarities, the State government ensures that Christian organizations are active under
very different conditions than Muslim ones. Apart from government attempts to control
their activities either through shari’a legislation or direct intervention, Christian groups
receive very little government support or encouragement, and their activities are taxed
because it is assumed that they are carried out ‘for profit’. Meanwhile, Muslim
organizations are exempt from tax and generally receive government support at different
levels, including payment of teachers’ salaries, protection by hisbah groups and, often,
other government donations (ibid., p. 43).
 In short, according to Nolte et al, Kano’s shift to integrationist politics has had some paradoxical
effects. Undoubtedly it has fuelled Islamic radicalization and a sense of victimhood and discrimination
among Christians. However, the debate about shari’a  has also provided some underpinning for
democratization in the state by welding more firmly the political and intellectual groups and in
launching an engaged discussion (and Islamic jurisprudence) about the applicability of shari’a courts to
non-Muslims (ibid., pp. 23-4).  To what extent these trends are moving towards exclusionary
democratization or inclusionary liberalization of shari’a remains to be seen.
In contrast to Kano, the state of Anambra in the south west of Nigeria has a Christian majority.
However, governance in this state has historically depended on well-established links with northern
Muslim politicians, who have been mentors to leading state politicians. Unlike Kano, in Anambra Nolte
et al found that ROs operate within a non-discriminatory framework and without penal taxation,
although they are differentiated by their activities (Christian ROs more inclined to education and health
provision; Muslim towards self-support) and their closeness to power. This proximity is due less to
religious difference than the imbrication of religious actors in ‘godfather politics’ - the federally
sponsored and funded patron who delivers the state’s vote to national parties, and in the process,
thoroughly deinstitutionalizes and destabilizes state politics.32 Thus the difference between the
Anglican and Catholic Churches over elections in the state in 2007 had less to do with doctrinal
matters than support for, and opposition to,  ‘godfather politics’; and these differences often also
cross-cut religious divides so that ethnicity (e.g. Hausa ) trumps religion (e.g. Muslim or Christian).
Yet unlike Kano, there is a considerable degree of religious tolerance, underpinned by the effective
operation at the local level of the ‘federal character principle’ (religious and ethnic proportionality in
appointments).  This outcome, as Nolte et al perceptively surmise:
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…is presumably possible because the political elite of the state consists of individuals
whose power is not religious in the same manner as that of the northern Nigerian
aristocracy. Also, the high degree of violence involving ‘godfathers’ and their clients
suggests that there is a higher degree of fission within the elite, which suggests the elite
might be less successful in subverting and excluding religious movements…All the
same, the opportunities for FBOs to engage with government remain dependent on their
political links. On the one hand, this means that the nation’s patronage politics are not
necessarily religiously based or biased. On the other hand, as the rift between the
Catholic and Anglican denominations illustrates, the politicization of religion also
encourages FBOs to ‘religionize’ patronage politics (ibid, p. 62-63).
    The highly competitive context within which religious actors like the ROs operate in Anambra also
characterize the south-western state of Oyo, a largely Yoruba-speaking state with a mixed population
of Christians, Muslims and traditionalists. In Oyo, the rivalries of ‘godfather’ politics have been
complicated by the marginalization of Obasanjo, a former Nigerian president, who hails from the
adjoining Ogun state. Despite these complications, ROs in the state were least affected by religious
differences, and there appeared to be little difference in their mode of operation and effectiveness in
dealing with the State administration. If anything, the State government encourages new ROs,
probably because local elites are more able to manage them effectively. Where differences are
observable, they often occur along ethnic lines, for example, Hausa-speaking Muslim ROs and the
pervasive discrimination against Hausas, who are generally regarded as recent in-migrants. Despite
these fissures, inter-religious cohesion is sustained by active utilization of the ‘federal character
principle’, which ensures equitable representation in political and administrative structures. It is also
reflected in periodic cross-communal  mobilization against ‘godfather politics’ which, in one instance,
“brought together Ibadan’s traditional elite, a Muslim candidate and a Catholic pro-democracy
organization in order to defeat a Christian candidate who had been installed by a Muslim ‘godfather’”
(ibid., p. 76). Again, as Nolte et al, conclude:
This case clearly illustrates that while religious rivalry constitutes part of everyday politics
in Oyo, FBOs are involved in politics not so much on the basis of their religion but on the
basis of their position within local politics. However, the boundaries between ethnicity,
indigeneity and religion are sometimes blurred, and like in Anambra, it seems the
politicization of religion by ‘godfathers’ or their opponents in the state encourages FBOs
to introduce religion into patronage politics (ibid., p. 76).
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In summarizing the evidence from the Nigerian case studies, it is instructive to note that historical
tradition and structures of governance (or, rather, malgovernance) are the primary determinants of the
effectiveness of religious actors in politics and of their inability to be the core drivers of change for pro-
poor policies and development. Successive constitutional changes have placed a premium on religion,
ethnicity, and indigeneity to the exclusion of non-religion, class, and non-indigeneity – all the elements
that, arguably, make for a common sense of citizenship. These developments are most conspicuous
in Kano, where (non-radical) Muslim organizations are well integrated into state structures; other
states like Anambra and Oyo also reflect these changes, though here the fault lines of exclusion are
not religion but ethnicity and indigeneity.  In all three states, identity politics has produced exclusionary
categories which, by virtue of their exclusion, are prone to radicalization and violence while using the
same idioms as the included groups. This paradox has its roots in the ‘crisis of governance’. However,
as Nolte et al conclude, it can only be addressed effectively by development:
…the ability of religious organizations to participate in politics and governance is strongly
inter-related  with patterns of exclusion based on linguistic, ethnic and religion identity as
well as on intra-Nigerian struggles to limit the political participation of certain groups
through the requirement of ‘indigeneity’ at the level of…states. As a result of this, the
relationship between the state and FBOs is uneven and non-equitable: in all states there
were some FBOs that were excluded from participation in local politics while others had
close access to the state. The unevenness of relations to the state contributed to
mistrust and fear in the relationship of FBOs with each other, and the resultant fears
about religion or other identity-based forms of exclusion are likely to contribute to
retaliatory practices at different levels, thus contributing to deepening social divisions.
Consequently, attempts to reduce the intensity of religious conflicts must engage with
concerns over poverty and development and diminish the impact of patrimonial politics
and ‘indigeneity’ (ibid., p. 3).
3.4 The role of religious organizations in a differentiated polity
(Tanzania)
In Tanzania, ROs perform functions similar to those in Nigeria. However, despite the roughly equal
numbers of Christians and Muslims (see above), the Tanzania polity has so far resisted the pressures
towards a closer integration of politics and religion, even in overwhelmingly Muslim Zanzibar.
Conventionally, this outcome is to found in the existence of cross-cutting political cleavages, internal
divisions within the two dominant religious communities and the socialist inheritance of the years after
independence. In practice, these co-exist with a great deal of political control that is exercised over
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Muslim affairs, to a point where radical critics suggest that Tanzanian secularism is a form of
‘hegemonic control’. Not unnaturally, in this context ROs’ encounters with the state produce highly
discordant discourses, which divide sharply along religious lines.
The governance context in which ROs operate in Tanzania, as we have seen above, is defined by the
change from a controlled socialist political system crafted by Julius Nyerere to a plural, competitive
polity based on a market economy. This transformation has occurred since the mid-1980s and has
been accompanied by pressures to reassess state-religion relationships that have rested on the
bedrock of secularism. Greater openness and political competition has been followed by demands,
especially from Muslim politicians, for more transparency and accountability in the ways the state
manages its relations with religious communities. In particular, this has been represented by radical
Muslim voices, which argue that Tanzanian politics has an inbuilt anti-Muslim bias which results in
their exclusion, discrimination and disadvantage (Bakari, 2008).
Before this issue is addressed directly, it is necessary to acknowledge that case studies from
Tanzania are less comprehensive and rigorous than those from India, Pakistan or Nigeria.33
Nevertheless, they provide valuable insights into contemporary discourses among Christian, Muslim
and state-sponsored Muslim ROs about politics and their engagement with the state. These case
studies include Christian ROs (the Christian Council of Tanzania – CCT - and the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Tanzania - ELCT) and Muslim FBOs (Baraza Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania -
BAKWATA), Baraza Kuu La Jumuiya Na Taasisi Kiislam Tanzania (BARAZA KUU – Supreme Council
of Islamic Organizations), which operate in mainland Tanzania, and UAMSHO (Association for Islamic
Propagation, Zanzibar) and the Mufti’s Office in Zanzibar (a government department that overseas
Muslim affairs on the island).
Christian organizations were, in general, extremely supportive of the principle of state secularism,
which they regard as the bedrock of Tanzanian politics, and do not view secularism as potentially
discriminatory or problematic for other religious communities.  They also acknowledge that they enjoy
close access to state institutions, but assert that this is not always followed by positive policy
decisions, for the state continues to exercise its relative autonomy in religious matters. At the same
time, these organizations are adamant in their opposition to any erosion of the principle of state
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secularism, hostility reflected in their mobilization against Zanzibar’s membership of the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC), the demand for the reinstitution of Khadi courts on the mainland, and
Muslim claims of discrimination, exclusion and disadvantage. The latter were often dismissed by
informants in terms of cultural patterns of behaviour, for instance, lower average educational levels of
the Muslim population or limited female participation in the workforce.  Overall, the discourses of these
ROs were uncritical of contemporary patterns of governance, which are regarded as the natural
dispensation for Tanzania.
In contrast, Muslim ROs, especially BARAZA KUU and UAMSHO, perceive a structural imbalance in
the Tanzanian polity towards Christianity, seen in its accommodation of Christian ROs.  This
imbalance, according to these organizations, has historical roots, in that under British colonialism
churches were favoured and Christians gained access to the limited educational facilities available,
many provided by missionaries. As a result, according to these organizations, Muslims have been and
continue to be under-represented in key sectors of government employment and official positions.34
They also believe that Christian organizations, because of their privileged position and resources,
have been more able to influence state policy than their Muslim equivalents. They have politically
mobilized to press their demands, for example, the re-introduction of Khadi courts on the mainland.
Perhaps most disconcerting for informants from these Muslim organizations in recent times has been
the perceived use of anti-terror measures to limit the human rights of Muslim activists, including the
right to religious freedom (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006). Although the state-sponsored Mufti’s Office in
Zanzibar and BAKWATA do not support this critique, even they recognize that in recent years such
transgressions have taken place (Nyirabu, 2009).
These discourses give us only glimpses into how religious actors operate in Tanzanian politics, and
clearly a more comprehensive evaluation is required. Nonetheless, our fragmentary insights suggest
that two key dimensions are framing the relationship between religion and politics: the gradual
transition from a controlled socialist polity to a plural, market driven one; and the growing mobilization
of some Muslim groups against a strongly felt sense of discrimination and disadvantage in the public
sphere. It is in this setting that “inequalities and injustices that were viewed through a class lens under
Ujamaa…are now being viewed through religious and ethnic lenses…[thereby] raising tension[s]
between the state and religion” (ibid., p.50). While mobilization along religious lines is construed by
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many as a threat to the conventional understanding of national integration, in which politics and religion
occupy separate realms, for others, this mobilization provides an opportunity to craft new institutions
of governance that can better ensure equality and justice, including the representation of religious
identities (Bakari, 2009, p. 33; Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006).
3.5 Religious actors and inclusive development that engages the
poor and women (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)
As noted above, there is a general assumption that religious actors in the South are more likely than
not to represent poor segments of society. This assumption is sometimes linked to state failure -
which provides spaces for religious actors to provide service delivery that otherwise would not occur -
and the size of and resources commanded by FBOs (Marshall, 2005).  If this is, indeed, the case,
then we need to ask how the organizations considered here measure up in representing the poor. How
do the ROs engage with the most deprived and disadvantaged? And related to this, to what extent do
religious actors in the cases studied address gender concerns in their vision of development and
governance, both internally and within broader society?
Not unexpectedly our case studies provide mixed evidence. The clearest example of engagement with
the poor emerged in the case of Dalits in India, who are identified as being on the ‘margins of the
margins’ in terms of socio-economic indicators. That they were able to mobilize and to use their
religio-caste status to do so owed as much to the political incentives for such mobilization (for political
parties) as internal community dynamics. Interestingly, mobilization by some Dalit groups unleashed
competitive demands from other Dalit groups seeking to protect their share of job reservation quotas,
for example in Punjab (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, pp. 44-54). Equally, while the neo-Buddhists had
historically represented the traditional Dalit group, improvements in their social status and social
mobility in this community had somewhat distanced sections of it from the really disadvantaged,
though to be fair, neo-Buddhists remain active in tackling  pervasive discrimination against their
community in rural areas (ibid., pp. 69-82).
Similarly, the evidence from the MMA case study suggests that the targeted recipients of the coalition’s
policies were several different groups, which did not clearly represent the economically and socially
disadvantaged.  It is no doubt correct that the government redirected development resources to some
Working Paper 5546
of the most underdeveloped districts, which also happened to be the support base of leading political
figures in the coalition, but this was an extension of traditional patronage politics rather than a
concerted effort to tackle poverty. In brief, poverty reduction for the MMA remained a secondary priority
to its ideological commitment to Islamicize governance and society (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.51-
70).
In Nigeria, in contrast, there was significant evidence of ROs’ engagement with economically and
socially marginalized groups. These ROs shared a common vocabulary of development, but also
reflected their constituents and participated in poverty reduction measures. The Justice, Development
and Peace Commission’s (JDPC) efforts in Anambra state, for instance, are “directed to alleviating the
inconvenience of the poor, the physically-challenged, [and] the marginalized” (Nolte et al, 2009, p. 81).
Nasrul-Lahi-II-Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) also attempts to encourage self-development and
provides support for small-scale business ventures. However, the organizations acknowledged that
these efforts are unable to overcome the sea of poverty in Nigeria, where the incidence of poverty had
increased from about a quarter of the population in 1980 to about two-thirds in 1996 (ibid., p. 51). In
these conditions, distinguishing between the poor and the deserving poor was portrayed as a real
labour of Sisyphus, creating painful dilemmas for ROs engaged in working with the poor.
If the evidence on our case studies of religious actors’ articulation of the demands of the poor is
somewhat mixed, their record on mainstreaming gender in their activities is also ambiguous. At one
extreme, it verges on explicit notions of ‘separate development’; at the other, it acknowledges the need
for elements of equality but still qualifies this substantially, to the extent of neglecting it altogether.
In the NWFP in Pakistan, the MMA’s conception of development involved ‘erasing women’ from
presence in public life.  This entailed restrictions on girls’ education; compelling women students to
join a female only medical college; preventing women from voting or holding office; creating an
atmosphere in which four women councillors  were killed and many were allowed out only with a male
chaperone; and tolerating honour killers of women (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.53-4).  This hostility
was also directed towards women’s NGOs, which were seen to be “alienated from the issues at the
grassroots” and inordinately “focused on women’s rights.” These NGOs, according to the MMA, were
“undermining the cultural identity of Pakistan”, which is best articulated by Islamic NGOs which are
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doing “God’s work” (ibid., p. 60).  In sum, the MMA pursued an unrelenting vision of ‘separate
development’, in which conventional assumptions about gender and development were turned upside
down.
In Nigeria, the records of religious actors suggest that gender-centring is mediated by ethno-religious
factors. While all the ROs studied have women’s wings that encourage women’s participation or use
such participation strategically in their dealings with the state, male domination of the organizations is
a common characteristic, enabling “women’s interests [to be]…kept under close control” (Nolte et al.,
2009, p. 84-85). Nevertheless, there are some significant differences between ROs over the meaning
of women’s empowerment, and these differences do not always correspond to religious traditions.
Thus in northern Nigeria, the differences between Muslim and Christian organizations on the subject
were ones of degree rather than kind, whereas in southern Nigeria the same organizations have a
more positive assessment of the need to promote gender equality in their activities and internal
organization.  As Nolte et al conclude:
…differences between the world religions are less pronounced than differences
associated with ethno-religious origin. Clearly, both Christians and Muslims in northern
Nigeria emphasize a stronger gender separation than their counterparts in the south, and
women’s roles are perceived as determined by their obligations towards their fathers,
husbands and children. In turn, certainly among Muslims, these male relations are also
obligated to support them. In Muslim and Christian communities in the south, however,
women are seen as inherently capable and as powerful as men. However, the
expectations of female leadership in most Muslim groups are limited to worldly success
while some Christian churches afford women the same ability to provide spiritual
leadership as men (ibid., p. 88-89).
Among the Dalit communities in India, the mobilization for affirmative action had undoubtedly been
accompanied by the empowerment of women. However, women still lag behind men in terms of their
representation and leadership roles in the organizations studied, which are mainly controlled by men,
with separate chapters for women. According to one respondent, Dalit women are in:
…a double victimized position: one, at the level of being a Dalit and the other at being a
woman. That is untouchability from the other communities and oppression from within
their own community. But still [our] community does seem to be not so sensitive to the
issues of women (Khairlanjhi, quoted in Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p. 81).
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Not surprisingly this insensitivity was attributed largely to community leaders who place communal
goals ahead of tackling patriarchy and marginalization within Dalit communities (ibid., p. 81).
Overall,  our case studies suggest that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about  religious
actors – communities, political parties or ROs – being strongly anchored in support of the poorest
sections of the community, or responding positively to the challenges of development and gender in
their activities in ways that conform to the standard expectations of the ‘good governance’ agenda.
Religious actors’ behaviour is mediated by their religious ideals and the social and governance
structures within which they are embedded, and the existence of such diversity is, perhaps to some
degree, to be expected.
3.6 The contribution of religious actors to transforming
contemporary governance (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)
Traditionally, religious actors in the public sphere have been viewed by their critics as bearers of non-
transactionable demands and divisive conceptions of citizenship, as well as inclined, as we have seen
in the case of MMA in Pakistan, to promote discrimination, for example, against women (Barry, 2001).
More often than not, they are seen as the bearers of collective values which demand special rights or
opt-outs from general rule-making, especially in areas such as state-religion relations, pro-life issues,
marriage, sexualities, health and morality (Levy, 2000).  Such demands generally place religious
actors on the ‘wrong side’ of the ‘progressive agenda’, because translating them into policy can result
in asymmetrical forms of citizenship that are sometimes highly contested or, in some cases, result in
real or imagined fears of religious hegemony by non-religious groups. Consequently, with reference to
our case studies we need to ask: To what extent has the engagement of religious actors in politics
allayed such fears? And is there any evidence of transformative practices amongst contemporary
religious actors?
The Nigerian case studies and wider experience offer four major pointers that are especially
noteworthy. First, creative encounters between Christian and Muslim ROs are, in some cases,
resulting in theological changes which offer the possibility of accommodation with the ‘other’ through
emulation rather than stigmatization, which has traditionally been the conventional response to inter-
faith encounters (Cf. Jaffrelot, 1996).35 Hence NAFSAT, a Muslim RO, has been at the forefront of
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emulating Pentecostal practices in catering to its constituency, while learning from its religious
competitor to engage better with the local state. Second, the adoption of shari’a law in the northern
states has, to some extent, avoided the Islamophobia present elsewhere in the South, mainly because
the existence of significant non-Muslim communities in these states has generated a creative debate
about the applicability of shari’a  jurisdiction to non-Muslims, some of whom voluntarily choose to seek
redress in the shari’a  courts. Third, while seemingly mobilizing around the idiom of religion, religious
actors are also using the text, or language, of the state to articulate their demands. Although there is a
danger that such usage is a rhetorical device, at the same time it does open up such language to
interrogation. Finally, religious actors are a major constituent of the social diversity that underpins
Nigeria’s politics of proportionality at all levels, a politics that has become enshrined in the ‘federal
character principle’. This may well, as Nolte et al insist, result in “mediocrity”, pork-barrel politics, and
“limitations on choice”, but it enables the state to remain the final arbiter, supports “mutual exchange
and negotiations” and alleviates some forms of discrimination.  The onus, therefore, according to Nolte
et al, is on “the state to encourage more equitable relations between religious organizations, and to
overcome or reduce the prevailing rhetoric of marginalization” (ibid., p. 108).
In response to encounters with the state, theological change is also discernible among religious actors
in India. Dalit Muslims, like some Muslim women’s groups which are seeking to reform Muslim
personal law from within, demonstrate that tradition can be contested on theological and empirical
grounds, thus confirming the dictum that such change is perhaps better negotiated by religious actors
themselves, through what Nussbaum calls the ‘principle of moral constraint’, than externally imposed
(Nussbaum, 2000, p.195).  Such encounters have reaffirmed what Rudolph and Rudoulph (1967) term
the remarkable ‘modernity of tradition’, in which in India, ascriptive identities like caste, against the
perceived conventional wisdom, continue to play a major role in democratic consolidation.  Indeed, as
Mahajan (2010b, p. 21) has observed, because in contemporary India religion seeks to totalize politics,
while caste (and other identities) fragment it, Dalit-based religious groups among Hindus, Muslims and
Sikhs act as important checks and balances against political movements which promote religious
homogenization; with their size ensuring, electorally at least, that Dalit demands are recognized by
both religious and non-religious parties. As in Nigeria, in India the state remains the final arbiter
between religious groups because instead of asserting the hegemony they desire, they have to live
with and accommodate plurality and diversity.
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Undoubtedly there is similar evidence in Tanzania of changes in religious actors’ theological outlook as
result of encounters with the state, though to be fair, the case studies did not fully capture this
important dimension.  What is evident is that some ROs, notably Muslim ones, are keen to appropriate
discourses of rights and discrimination to critique governance, while simultaneously advocating new
institutions that can accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, if not chime with the multicultural
ideal (Bakari, 2008, p. 33).  This response may well reflect the fact that criticism of the status quo in
Tanzania is only now emerging into a systematic critique, following gradual economic and political
liberalization. It is also indicative of the fact that the ROs are keen to build on their experience of
encounters with the state and inter-religious relations with other ROs to ensure a berth for religion in
the construction of Tanzanian multiculturalism, which can build on the country’s secular heritage and
provide new political spaces for religious identities and inter-faith dialogues.
Finally, experience of religious actors in Pakistan probably provides the least convincing evidence for
the argument that they are capable of transforming governance in ways which do not reinforce
stereotypes of the incommensurate nature of politics and religion. However, as noted above on several
occasions, the current crisis of Pakistan’s polity is a crisis within the permanent establishment, which
includes religious actors. Insofar as segments of the latter articulate an alternative vision of Pakistan,
they also give some voice to those for whom religion has become an act of rebellion, expressing
serious disenchantment with the developmental performance of the state, however this is defined.  In
one sense such rebellions may well be symptoms rather than the cause. As Waseem and Mufti (2009,
pp. 71-3) conclude, democratic consolidation in Pakistan will require an accommodation with
Pakistan’s Islamic identity – politically mobilized or not – in ways that significantly diminish the
propensity to violence or forms of political closure that always lead to military rule.  To what extent the
current campaign against militancy permanently restructures the rule of the game to ensure
democratic consolidation remains to be seen.
Religion, Politics and Governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania: An Overview 51
4 Assessment: comparative lessons for religion,
politics and governance in developing countries
Probably because it was largely unanticipated, the ‘return of religion’ to public life in both developed
and developing societies is yet to produce a systematic body of literature capable of understanding the
manifold complexities of this phenomenon at various levels, and within particular political and social
formations. It is perhaps a truism to say that in the South “religion and politics are linked together in
complex ways” (Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011, p.52): the question is how this complexity can be
untangled and whether religion is an independent variable defining governance  or a complex social
phenomenon that is embedded in different ways across economic, social, cultural and political
systems. After being overshadowed by security and policy concerns stemming from the rise of ethno-
religious violence in the early 1990s and the fallout from 9/11, some of these issues are only now
being addressed.36  Comparatively, notwithstanding the current phase of globalization, one of the most
promising ways to map this change, as observed above, is through the sociological principle of
differentiation, which seeks to explore the extent to which state and religion are differentiated and
integrated, and the processes that separate them and bring them together. This principle enables us
to identify discrete areas in the interface between the state and religion that each influences, or seeks
to influence, the way this change manifests itself, and the modes of accommodation between the two.
It does not, however, directly address the causes of such change.37
One of the most striking observations from the review of literature on the relationships between
religion and politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania is the dramatic shift from the secularist (or
quasi–secularist, in the case of Pakistan) settlement agreed at independence. It now seems quite
obvious that this change was triggered by the ‘crisis of governance’ from the late 1970s onwards,
which witnessed the erosion or significant weakening of the political formations dating from the end of
colonial rule. In this crisis, new spaces were created for religious formations. Most dramatically, this
change resulted in the mobilization of religious identities in elections by religious and religious-
nationalist parties; efforts by integrationist regimes (Pakistan and northern Nigeria) to co-opt  demands
for Islamacization and the imposition of shari’a ; the transformation of ‘religions of resistance’ into
‘religions of rebellion’ that have now become the harbingers of subaltern revolt; and the emergence of
discourses of discrimination and disadvantage based on religious identity.  Taken together, these
changes have eroded some fundamental principles, such as the freedom of religion, freedom to
change one’s religion, gender rights, and rights of religious minorities, as well as redefining the
relationship between collective religious groups and the state. And though against these trends are
powerful countervailing forces, such as the revival of the Congress party in India and the political
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resilience of the secularist regime in Tanzania, the overwhelming weight of evidence, including from
contemporary surveys, suggests that in the medium term religion will remain ‘de-privatized’.
Alongside these general trends, it is also useful to identify some key propositions that have
implications beyond the four countries discussed here.
First, even in states that are religiously homogenous (e.g. Pakistan), democratic governance operates
to undercut religious extremism because engagement in competitive politics by religious actors opens
them up to scrutiny by the public and a need for accommodation. Conversely, political closure (e.g.
military regimes) encourages religious essentialism, pressures towards a greater integration of
religion and the state, and the use of religious actors by the state as a surrogate for its own legitimacy.
Paradoxically, it also creates a vicious circle of radicalization because, as the state increasingly
usurps religious functions, the only way of contesting the efficacy of these functions is by outbidding
the state by appeal to more ‘authentic’ religious authorities or texts. Such integrationist efforts often
falter on the rock of social inclusivity because, as in the cases of Nigeria and Pakistan, socially
excluded or marginalized groups within a religious tradition are more easily mobilized by radical
groups ‘from below’ than ‘from above’ by religious elites working within state structures
(‘establishments’ e.g. Pakistan and the Muslim aristocracy in northern Nigeria).  These kinds of
integrationist efforts are probably most prone to turning ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of
rebellion’, because they are aimed at the cooption of religious demands without any serious
commitment to deliver on part of the state.
Second, the interests of the poor among religious communities are more likely to be articulated if there
are specific incentives for political parties to do so (such as the potential number of voters and their
support base in electoral politics) and programmes targeted at these groups (e.g. affirmative action,
proportionality) are available.  As witnessed in the Indian case studies, these factors have not only
Dalitized  contemporary Indian politics, but the wholesale mobilization of Dalit communities in India has
also proved an effective counter-balance against the drive towards religious  homogenization by the
Hindu nationalist BJP.  Ironically, this interaction between democracy and development also has some
unintended consequences for marginalized groups like Dalits themselves: it ‘deconstructs’ and
‘constructs’ communities as they seek to adapt to the rules of the political game, thereby reinforcing,
as well as challenging, their engagement in politics (Cf. Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009).
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Third, religious actors do not always have an unambiguous record on governance and development.
While most share a critique of underdevelopment, their discourses on the meaning and purpose of
development are widely divergent, with some enthusiastic about the normative ‘good governance’
agenda and others articulating alternative conceptions of ‘development’ which foreground religious
ideals and practices. These tendencies were most apparent in the performance and activities of
religious or religious nationalist political parties, such as the MMA coalition, which demonstrated a
strong propensity towards the integration of religion and politics but weak performance on realizing its
stated developmental. In their discourses and policies, these parties were inclined to project
alternative visions of development which avoided problematizing gender discrimination, religious
discrimination or exclusionary practices against the poor or marginal religious communities, either in
terms of public policy or within the theologies of their own traditions.  ROs examined, on the other
hand, particularly in Africa, tend to demonstrate a greater affinity with the ‘good governance’ agenda,
although this is qualified by the nature of the religious tradition with which they are associated.
Fourth, encounters between religion and the state are, as noted in our use of the differentiation-
integration matrix, not static but dynamic, fluid and changeable. Just as the ‘good governance’ agenda
in Africa and Asia has impelled the state to be more accommodative of cultural and religious diversity
and gender equality, sometimes at the behest of external donors and multi-lateral development
agencies, in the same way, in some cases, religious traditions and theologies have also provided
creative new responses to traditional dilemmas. It is in these examples that new patterns of
engagement between religious actors and the state and between religious actors themselves have
been observed - patterns that extend inter-faith dialogue beyond mere tolerance and accommodation
to echo Nandy’s (1998, p. 338) call for “each of the major faiths to include within it an in-house version
of other faiths, both as internal criticism and as a reminder of the diversity of theories of
transcendence.”
However it is necessary to acknowledge that such departures remain substantially at the margins of
the main discourses on religion and the state in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania. Indeed, their
limited impact demonstrates how challenging it is for religious actors in Africa and Asia to be drivers of
governance and developmental change because these actors are, by and large, socially embedded.
These constraints, moreover, and the largely socially undifferentiated nature of these societies - where
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the pressures to ‘totalize’ religions are strong - ensures that religion as a subject for public policy will
continue to arouse deep public passions. The current discourse in India on the recommendations of
the Sachar Committee is a test case for this area in developing countries in Asia and Africa.
In conclusion, the relationships between religion, politics and governance in our case study countries
are far more complex and variegated than ever before, highlighting both the manifold dimensions of
contemporary governance and the changing role of religious traditions within these societies.  What is
clear is that concentrating on understanding generic policies to improve governance and levels of
development is probably more likely to help us unravel the real place of religion in contemporary
governance in the South than an exclusive focus on the role and performance of religious actors.
Recognizing the importance of this is the first crucial step towards a more meaningful understanding
of the implications of ‘return of religion’ in developing societies.
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Appendix 1
List of case study organizations and communities
India (Religious communities)
Valmikis and Mazhabis (Punjab)
Other Backward Caste Muslims (Maharashtra)
‘Ex-Hindu’ Buddhists/Mahars (Maharashtra)
Pakistan (Political parties)
Muttahida-Majlise-e-Amal (MMA-coalition in NWFP)
Nigeria (ROs)
Name of RO Anambra Kano Oyo 
Ansar-Ud-Deen Society (ADS)  X X 
Anglican Church (Church of Nigeria, CofN) X   
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)  X X 
Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)  X  
Hausa Muslim Community Awka (HMCO) X   
Izalatul-Bid’a Wa Iqamat (Izala)  X  
[Roman Catholic] Justice, Development and Peace 
Commission (JDPC) X  X 
Nasrul-Lahi-Il-Fathi Society (NASFAT)  X X 
Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) X  X 





Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT)
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT)
Muslim
Baraza Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA),
Baraza Kuu La Jumuiya Na Taasisi Kiislam Tanzania (BARAZA KUU – Supreme Council of Islamic
Organisations), Zanzibar
UAMSHO (Association for Islamic Propagation, Zanzibar)
Mufti’s Office, Zanzibar
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Appendix 2
Religious populations of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania
Religious population of India, 2001






Jains  0.41 
Others 0.65 
Religion not stated 0.07 
 
Religious population of Pakistan, 1998




Qadiani (Ahmadi) 0.22 
Scheduled Castes 0.25 
Others 0.07 
 
Source: Census of India 2001
Source: Census of Pakistan 1998
Religious population of Nigeria, 2010
Religion Per cent 
Muslim 50 
Christian 40 
African Traditional Religions 10 
 Source: CIA The World Factbook (2010 – online)
Religious population of Tanzania, 2010
Religion Per cent 
Mainland Tanzania* 
Muslims 47 




 Source: * Msanja and Lawi, 2006, p. 98 (based on sample survey, 2000).
** CIA The World Factbook (2010 – online)
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Notes
1 The term South is used here to refer to low income developing countries in Asia and Africa .
2 The term ‘religious actors’ is used to refer to religious communities, faith based organizations
(FBOs), religious political parties and other such organizations that articulate and represent
religious political interests.
3 The selection of these countries was influenced by their geographical location (in South Asia and
West and East Africa) and religious composition (in the case of India, Nigeria and Tanzania, two or
more of the major world religions, and Pakistan as an overwhelmingly Muslim country) (see
www.rad.bham.ac.uk).
4 The concept of governance is prone to multiple misconstructions and is often conflated with the
normative ‘good governance agenda’. In this report, it refers to the authoritative management of
policies and practices by the state, para-state agencies and networks. Governance is thus distinct
from, but overlaps with, the broader processes of politics.
5 The term development in this report is used in its conventional sense as referring to economic and
social change resulting in material transformation. This usage is, of course, not unproblematic,
since development is a normative enterprise that rests on values. For a brief overview of thinking
about development, see Nkurunziza (2007).
6 Gurharpal Singh at the University of Birmingham designed the overall research and was
responsible for its comparative dimension. In each country, research was  undertaken by a
research lead/s ( India – Gurpreet Mahajan and Surinder S. Jodhka, Pakistan  - Mohamed Waseem
and Mariam Mufti, Nigeria – Insa Nolte et al, Tanzania -  Mohabe Nyirabu), supported by research
assistants who undertook fieldwork. For further details see Mahajan and Jodhka (2009), Waseem
and Mufti (2009), Nolte et al (2009) and Nyirabu (2009).
7 For a discussion of these terms, see Rakodi (2007).  In this report we take a middle position
between a static, trans-historical definition of religion (see Geertz, 1973) and religion as a free-
floating ‘discursive practice’ (Casanova, 1994). Such a position, we believe, recognizes the
functional equivalence of religion in the four countries but also acknowledges the extent to which
changes and its social meaning vary with context.  A distinction can also be drawn between
religious or faith-based organizations and religious communities.  FBOs can be defined as religious
organizations with structures, aims and objectives and an organizational history, while  religious or
faith communities refers to wider religious entities that share a religious identity, but do not
necessarily have such organizational characteristics.
8 The research programme has found it helpful to limit the use of the term FBO to organizations that
are organizationally distinct within their parent religious traditions. Typically, they have a mission and
usually funding, staff etc.
9 For a discussion of how these impacted on the case studies see Mahajan and Jodhka (2009),
Waseem and Mufti (2009), Nolte et al (2009) and Nyirabu (2009).
10 For further details of the process through which the states were selected, see Mahajan and Jodhka
(2009).
11 For the selection process in Nigeria, see Nolte et al (2009).
12 For Philpott, differentiation has four dimensions: i) whether the state grants a single religion
constitutional status as the official one; ii) whether the state exercises the prerogative to promote
religious purpose through legislation and judicial powers; iii) whether the state restricts the freedom
of religion from functioning; and iv) whether religious organizations hold constitutional prerogatives.
Differentiation, he argues, should not be equated with establishment (e.g. Iran and England) or the
influence that “religion or state exercise on one and another through persuasion, ideological
influence, or electoral power” (Philpott, 2007, p. 507).
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13 “A consensual arrangement is a stable one, where both parties are satisfied with the status quo. A
conflictual arrangement is one that at least one party wants to revamp…States where the authority
of religion and state are mutually meshed…are ones where differentiation is low but consensual. In
a final variant, where differentiation is low and conflictual, religious bodies are dominated and
suppressed, against their own will, sometimes despite their resistance. This relationship, too, is
integrationist in that the state has ‘integrated’ religion into its authority, as Communist Bulgaria and
Romania did to the Orthodox Church, whose choice was to consent or to die” (Philpott, 2007, p.
507).
14 For some, like Casanova (1994), differentiation may or may not lead to ‘privatization of religion’, as
is assumed in the model of highly differentiated societies. For Casanova, this outcome is possible
because “religious institutions and organisations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care
of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public
morality and to challenge the claims of sub-systems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt
from extraneous normative considerations. One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual,
interrelated process of repoliticisation of the private religious and moral spheres and
renormativisation of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for the lack of a
better term, the ‘deprivatisation’ of religion” (ibid., pp. 5-6).
15 Strictly speaking the BJP is not a religious but a Hindu-nationalist party. Its programme is often
described as promoting Hindutva (Hinduness, promotion of Hindu values). The BJP operates
alongside its sister organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a
paramilitary social organization, and the Vishwa Hindu Prishad (VHP), a religious body.
16 It needs to be recognized that there is no ideal model of a secular state. Each state secularism has
its own peculiarities. For a discussion of some of these variations see Smith (1967).
17 The period 1991-2 is often referred to as the Third Republic, when local and state elections were
held but the federal and presidential elections were annulled. In Nigeria, a partial overlap between
ethnic and religious identities and the salience of ethnic politics in the struggles over access to
resources (especially oil revenue and land) and political power leads some authors to prefer the
term ethno-religious politics (see Nolte et al, 2009). Overt integration of religion and the state
occurred mainly in the northern states, where Shari’a law was introduced. Less overt religious
influence was more widespread.
18 Not only are different religions dominant in different regions, but also the religious demography
inhibits outright dominance by one religion. Figures on the religious composition of both countries
vary (and are contested), but one recent estimate indicates roughly 50 per cent Christian and 50
per cent Muslim in Nigeria, 60 per cent Christian and a third Muslim in Tanzania (Pew Forum, 2010,
p. 64) (see also Appendix 2). Few in either country (particularly Nigeria) claim primary affiliation with
ATR.
19 Wilkinson (2006), in a pioneering study of Indian elections, has demonstrated the direct connection
between electoral competition and communal riots between Hindus and Muslims.
20 According to O’Leary and Arthur (1990, p.9), ‘hegemonic control’ exists where the main ethnic or
religious group or groups “can effectively dominate through its political, economic and ideological
resources and can extract what it requires from the subordinated.”
21 These terms are Bruce Lincoln’s (2003, pp. 82-91).
22 Due to operational difficulties, our Tanzania case study did not focus on the Islamist challenge.
However, it is important to recognize that many of the dimensions of this challenge are similar to
those in the other case study countries.
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23 Vanguard (Lagos), 28 July 2009, “Bauchi crisis – FG in control, Yar’Adua assures”
24 Since the death of its spiritual leader, Abubakar Gumi, Izala has separated into a number of groups.
I am thankful to Insa Nolte for pointing this out.
25  Unsurprisingly following the ‘war on terror’, the ‘Gulf War II’ and 7/7, these policy innovations have
been most apparent in the United Kingdom. For an overview of public policy in these areas see
Dinham, Furby and Lowndes, 2009.
26 See Mukandala et al (2006) for an independent attempt to review existing and produce new
evidence.
27 The discussion which follows draws substantially on Mahajan and Jodhka (2009).
28 For a further meaning of caste see Dumont (1966).
29 Dalits is the politically correct nomenclature for the ex-untouchables who have traditionally been on
the lowest rung of the Hindu caste hierarchy. It is a broad term that includes Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (listed in the schedule of reservation for central and state employment since
1950) and Backward Castes (a socio-economically defined group that was added to the reservation
quota in 1990). In this paper, the term is used to include groups among Muslims, Sikhs and
Buddhists in Maharashtra and Punjab.
30 Since 1950, the Indian state has provided reservations for jobs for Scheduled Castes (former
‘untouchables’) and Scheduled Tribes (pastoral communities) , as well as reserved legislative seats
in both the provincial and national legislatures. The scope of these affirmative action provisions has
been gradually extended, and in 1989 was increased to include ‘Other Backward Classes’. In
addition to job quotas, these groups are provided with reservations in education, though
reservations for OBCs was not accompanied by reservations of legislative assembly seats.
31 The term indigene is used in Nigeria to refer to local or indigenous populations and carries with it
certain legal and political rights vis-à-vis non-indigenes. See Nolte et al (2009).
32 ‘Godfather politics’ here shares a family resemblance to what Manor (1983), writing on India, has
called ‘de-institutionalisation of politics’ which was closely associated with triggering the ‘crisis of
governance’ in India .
33 Operational and practical difficulties meant that we were unable to conduct the kind of
comprehensive case studies in Tanzania that were undertaken in the three other countries.
34 Although there is clear evidence to support Muslim educational disadvantage and under-
representation, the 2006 study showed that efforts have been made to redress some of the
problems. The sample survey revealed that half the interviewees felt that the government had taken
measures to address the educational imbalance (Ishumi, 2006, p. 452) and fewer than one per cent
of both Christians and Muslims believed that religion influences access to civil service employment
or promotion (Chaligha, 2006).
35 Jaffrelot (1996) offers a useful distinction between stigmatization (vilification) and emulation (“the
borrowing of ideas and organizational principles…from opponents” (p. 12)).
36 Some of the new major research programmes include the Department for International
Development-funded Religions and Development Research Programme at the University of
Birmingham, U.K.; and the Arts and Humanities and the Economic and Social Research Councils
(U.K.)-funded Religion and Society Research Programme.
37 It must be acknowledged that the principle of differentiation only indirectly gives us insights into the
causes of the change in state-religion relationship. For the most part, as Philpott (2007)
conjectures, these are exogenous to the relationship itself and may actually arise from changes in
socio-economic circumstance, new ideologies, changes in demography, or external influences.
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